When an application parses an untrusted JWK through the public jose_jwk:from_binary/1 or jose_jwk:from_map/1 API (or the Elixir wrappers JOSE.JWK.from_binary/1 and JOSE.JWK.from_map/1), an RSA private key that supplies d, e, and n but omits all Chinese Remainder Theorem parameters (p, q, dp, dq, qi) is routed into convert_sfm_to_crt/1, which tries to recover the missing primes by factoring the modulus. The three integers are read straight from the base64url input and are never validated as a real RSA key. When the modulus cannot be split into two factors (for example, when it is itself prime), the search loop convert_sfm_to_crt_find_p/6 performs a modular exponentiation over the attacker-sized modulus on every iteration and never succeeds. A single request of a few hundred bytes forces close to one CPU-second of work before an internal one-second watchdog kills the worker, and a larger modulus raises the cost further. By flooding such requests an attacker can saturate every scheduler and deny service, without credentials, a valid RSA key, or any special configuration.
This issue affects jose: from 1.7.7 before 1.11.13.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Mon, 26 Oct 2026 20:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in erlang-jose allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a CPU-exhaustion denial of service by submitting a crafted RSA JSON Web Key. When an application parses an untrusted JWK through the public jose_jwk:from_binary/1 or jose_jwk:from_map/1 API (or the Elixir wrappers JOSE.JWK.from_binary/1 and JOSE.JWK.from_map/1), an RSA private key that supplies d, e, and n but omits all Chinese Remainder Theorem parameters (p, q, dp, dq, qi) is routed into convert_sfm_to_crt/1, which tries to recover the missing primes by factoring the modulus. The three integers are read straight from the base64url input and are never validated as a real RSA key. When the modulus cannot be split into two factors (for example, when it is itself prime), the search loop convert_sfm_to_crt_find_p/6 performs a modular exponentiation over the attacker-sized modulus on every iteration and never succeeds. A single request of a few hundred bytes forces close to one CPU-second of work before an internal one-second watchdog kills the worker, and a larger modulus raises the cost further. By flooding such requests an attacker can saturate every scheduler and deny service, without credentials, a valid RSA key, or any special configuration. This issue affects jose: from 1.7.7 before 1.11.13. | |
| Title | erlang-jose RSA JWK parsing attempts to factor an attacker-controlled modulus, enabling CPU-exhaustion denial of service | |
| First Time appeared |
Potatosalad
Potatosalad jose |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-407 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Potatosalad
Potatosalad jose |
|
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-26T19:53:45.204Z
Reserved: 2026-07-22T13:58:26.233Z
Link: CVE-2026-65631
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-26T20:17:58.997
Modified: 2026-10-26T20:17:58.997
Link: CVE-2026-65631
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
-
CWE-407
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity