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Search Results (393532 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89929 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVM: Ensure INVVPID is emulated on the correct physical CPU When emulating INVVPID, KVM executes INVVPID on the physical CPU using vpid02 (instead of the L1 assigned VPID), after doing some validations on the operands. However, it is possible that the physical CPU KVM executes INVVPID on is different from the CPU L2 is running on. For example, in the following scenario: - L2 runs on CPU #1 and exits to L1 (vmx->nested.vmcs02.cpu=1) - L1 migrates to CPU #2 and executes INVVPID - KVM executes INVVPID on CPU #2 - L1 migrates back to CPU #1 and runs L2 (vmx->nested.vmcs02.cpu=1) The TLB entries on CPU #1 are never invalidated, because INVVPID was executed on CPU #2, and vmcs02 never ran on a different pCPU (i.e. vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs() will *not* request KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH). Ensure that INVVPID is being executed on the same pCPU that L2 last ran on, and if not, fallback to clearing last_vpid=0 to trigger a full VPID flush on the next nested VM-Enter (as KVM will detect L1 using a different VPID for L2). If L2 ends up running on a different pCPU, KVM will flush the TLB anyway through vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89928 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Consume the locked rmap value in the lockless rmap walk __kvm_rmap_lock() deliberately elides the rmap lock when it observes an empty rmap. In that case kvm_rmap_lock_readonly() also re-enables preemption and returns zero, so the caller holds neither the rmap lock nor a preemption reference. The elision documents the invariant it relies on: * Elide the lock if the rmap is empty, as lockless walkers (read-only * mode) don't need to (and can't) walk an empty rmap, nor can they add * entries to the rmap. I.e. the only paths that process empty rmaps * do so while holding mmu_lock for write, and are mutually exclusive. kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() ignores the returned value and unconditionally enters for_each_rmap_spte_lockless(). The iterator started with rmap_get_first(), which re-reads rmap_head->val rather than using the value returned by the lock. If a writer populates the rmap between the lock's read and the iterator's re-read, the aging path walks the newly installed rmap without holding its lock. For a KVM_RMAP_MANY rmap this leaves the walker following a pte_list_desc chain that it never locked. A writer holding mmu_lock for write may free that chain (e.g. kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes() on the recycle path, or any rmap zap) via kmem_cache_free() while the walk is in progress, giving a slab use-after-free. Nothing serialises the two: the aging path runs without mmu_lock when CONFIG_KVM_MMU_LOCKLESS_AGING=y, and the rmap lock that would otherwise exclude the writer was elided. Because the empty path re-enables preemption, the interval between the two reads can span an arbitrary scheduling delay. Fix the class of bug by having the lockless walk consume the value returned by the lock instead of re-reading the rmap. Split rmap_get_first() into __rmap_get_first(), which starts an iterator from an already-read rmap value, and make for_each_rmap_spte_lockless() take that value and call __rmap_get_first() directly. kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() passes the value returned by kvm_rmap_lock_readonly(): when the lock was elided the value is zero, __rmap_get_first() returns NULL, and the walk is skipped. No lockless walker re-reads the rmap, so the lock-elision invariant cannot be violated, and no lock()-without-paired-unlock() path is added to the aging code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89927 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: hyper-v: Clamp stimer deadline to avoid livelock Fix an issue where userspace or the guest can program an Hyper-V synthetic timer to have a deadline in the past via integer overflow, preventing the CPU from making progress and triggering an RCU stall. Hyper-V's SynIC exposes 4 per-vCPU synthetic timers to the guest, which are emulated by KVM. Each is programmed through the HV_X64_MSR_STIMERi_CONFIG and HV_X64_MSR_STIMERi_COUNT MSRs. Depending on CONFIG, COUNT represents either the absolute expiration time or the period of a periodic timer, both expressed in 100ns ticks. These timers may be set both by the guest (WRMSR) and the host (KVM_SET_MSRS). When the timer is enabled, stimer_start() translates COUNT to an absolute monotonic deadline and arms an hrtimer. If COUNT is set to a value close to U64_MAX, the deadline calculation can overflow. ktime_add_ns(ktime_now, 100 * (stimer->exp_time - time_now)) This can result in a CPU livelock. stimer_start() arms the timer via hrtimer_start() with a deadline in the past, which causes it to immediately fire. The stimer callback then raises KVM_RQ_HV_STIMER, with the intention of causing KVM to deliver a synthetic interrupt on the next vCPU guest enter. Then, once userspace issues KVM_RUN, vcpu_enter_guest() consumes the request, calling kvm_hv_process_stimers(). This would normally disable the timer via stimer_expiration() once the deadline is in the past. However, the deadline comparison is done between the KVM reference counter and stime->exp_time, which is a big value close to U64_MAX, so this never happens for a few thousand years. kvm_hv_process_timers() then re-arms the timer via stimer_start(), since it was not disabled, which again fires immediately. Before entering the guest, kvm_vcpu_exit_request() checks kvm_request_pending(), which returns true due to the newly raised KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER. Then vcpu_enter_guest() aborts the guest entry, returning early into vcpu_run(), which loops back again into vcpu_enter_guest(), restarting the cycle. Since there are no manual yields in this loop, a task with SCHED_FIFO may starve RCU grace-period kthreads, which exposes the stalls found by syzcaller: rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: (detected by 1, t=10502 jiffies, g=14269, q=1142 ncpus=2) rcu: All QSes seen, last rcu_preempt kthread activity 10500 (4294965239-4294954739), jiffies_till_next_fqs=1, root ->qsmask 0x0 rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10500 jiffies! g14269 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=0 rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. ( ... ) Call Trace: <IRQ> __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1773 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x408/0xc30 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1841 hrtimer_interrupt+0x45b/0xaa0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1903 local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1045 [inline] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x102/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1056 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa1/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1056 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:697 RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 [inline] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194 Code: 74 05 e8 0b f4 5f f6 48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 00 00 9c 8f 44 24 20 f6 44 24 21 02 75 4f f7 c3 00 02 00 00 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 23 6b 27 f6 65 8b 05 7c 60 5a 07 85 c0 74 40 48 c7 04 24 0e 36 RSP: 0018:ffffc900040a7320 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 5de15cb931505900 RBX: 0000000000000a06 RCX: 5de15cb931505900 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffffff8daa9dc3 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffffc900040a73b0 R08: ffffffff8fc3d0 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-89926 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix length check __import_wp_info() struct kvm_hw_breakpoint::len is a __u64 that is fully controlled by user space. This is then assigned to wp_info->len, which is an int. The bounds check is done on the truncated value while the allocation uses the untruncated one: wp_info->len = bp_data->len; [...] if (wp_info->len < 0 || wp_info->len > MAX_WP_SIZE) return -EINVAL; wp_info->old_data = kmalloc(bp_data->len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); Use the validated value for the allocation as intended. Without this fix userspace can trigger >4GB allocations which will fail and result in a WARN due to MAX_PAGE_ORDER. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89925 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix memory leak in guest debug handling bp_data is freed only for the error case by kfree(bp_data). Every successful KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG will leak bp_data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89924 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix old_data leak in guest debug error path __import_wp_info() allocates a per-watchpoint old_data buffer to back up the original guest memory contents. If a later watchpoint of the same KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG request fails to import, kvm_s390_import_bp_data() jumps to the error label, which frees the wp_info array but not the old_data buffers of the entries that were imported successfully. Up to MAX_BP_COUNT - 1 buffers of up to MAX_WP_SIZE bytes are leaked per failed request, and the request can be repeated. Create error handling for cleaning up all created old_data memory areas. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89923 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Free guest debug data on vcpu destroy kvm_s390_clear_bp_data() is only called from kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(), i.e. when user space changes or disables debugging. A vCPU that is destroyed while hardware breakpoints are still armed - the normal case when the VMM just exits or crashes - leaks hw_bp_info, hw_wp_info and all old_data buffers, since generic KVM frees the vCPU right after kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(). That is bounded by MAX_BP_COUNT entries, so roughly 8 KiB per vCPU, but it is unbounded over VM lifetimes. The allocations are GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, so the charge also outlives the exiting process and pins dying memcgs. Fix by clearing the debug data on vCPU destruction. Calling it unconditionally is fine: struct kvm_vcpu is zero allocated, so for a vCPU that never enabled debugging the counters are 0 and the pointers NULL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89922 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Take srcu when importing watchpoint data __import_wp_info() backs up the original guest memory contents of a watchpoint with read_guest_abs(), which is kvm_read_guest() and therefore resolves the memslot via __kvm_memslots(). That requires kvm->srcu (or kvm->slots_lock) to be held, otherwise a concurrent memslot update can free the memslots array under us once its SRCU grace period has elapsed. As this is not fast path, following lock ordering (mutex first, then srcu) take the big hammer and hold the srcu for the full import. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89921 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Zero initialize data structures for inject_pfault_token __kvm_inject_pfault_token() only sets .type and .u.ext.ext_params2 of the on-stack struct kvm_s390_irq but the full ext substructure is copied into the cpu local variable on inject. ext_params and pad contain stale stack values. Interrupt delivery only uses ext_params2, so nothing leaks to the guest, but a host user can use the migration ioctls to get to the data. Fix by zero-initializing the irq struct. Do the same for the inti data structure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89920 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: Fix memory corruption by not reinjecting CK machine checks Channel-subsystem damage machine checks are for the host channel subsystem. The guest channel subsystem is emulated in the userspace VMM. There is no point in forwarding such machine checks into the guest. This also simplifies the machine check reinjection and avoids kfree of a stack variable as reported by sashiko. There might be still machine checks that have the ck bit set with another bit (like instruction damage), mask out the CK bit in s390_backup_mcck_info(), like the CP and ED bits already are. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89919 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: keyop: use mmu_lock to read gmap->asce Every other dat_* consumer in this file (kvm_s390_get_skeys, set_skeys, get_cmma_bits, set_cmma_bits, MEM_CLR_CMMA, kvm_s390_fixup_prefix, kvm_test_age_gfn, kvm_age_gfn) reads kvm->arch.gmap->asce *inside* the mmu_lock read-side. keyop is the only outlier. gmap->asce is mutated under write_lock(mmu_lock) by gmap_set_limit() and keyop might use a stale asce value for walking as KVM_S390_KEYOP and KVM_S390_VM_MEM_LIMIT_SIZE can run concurrently. This can result in memory corruption. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89918 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Correctly handle end of VA space TLBI invalidation Our TLB invalidation by VA code is based on comparing two ranges, one defined by the TLB, and one defined by the TLBI instruction. Each range is defined by a start and a size. However, the way the comparison is done doesn't account for address rollover, as it compares an address with (base + size). This works nicely until this expression represent the last page/block in the TTBR1 VA space, as the result is a big fat 0. And a failed TLB invalidation. Rewrite the comparison in a way that is immune to the address rollover (making the end address inclusive instead of exclusive), and move this into a common helper that is used by both VA and IPA invalidations, as suggested by Hyunwoo Kim (although the IPA version didn't suffer from this particular problem, obviously). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89917 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Handle VNCR TLB invalidation race with vcpu_put() VNCR unmapping While VNCR TLB invalidation always occurs under the MMU lock, vcpu_put() doesn't, while it unmaps the VNCR page. The problem is that the invalidation evaluates vncr_tlb::cpu to decide whether an unmapping needs to take place (cpu != -1) before performing it. On the other hand, this_cpu_reset_vncr_fixmap() unconditionally unmaps if L1_VNCR_MAPPED is set. These two obviously can race, with a TOCTOU pattern on the TLBI path, and a BUG_ON() on the vcpu_put() path. And the two can end-up calling vncr_fixmap(-1), with extra lethal effects. Move the reset of vncr_tlb::cpu to -1 to a common function, and make this update atomic so that only a single thread can reset the field and perform the corresponding unmap. The vcpu_put() still need to unconditionally unmap the current VNCR to close another ugly race. Finally, the assignment of vncr_tlb::cpu is moved to be kept in sync with the actual mapping, similar to L1_VNCR_MAPPED being set. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89916 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Make VNCR invalidation participate in MMU invalidation retry A VNCR TLB invalidation can occur on one vcpu while another vcpu is faulting in this same page. Without correctly handling this, we can end up with the following scenario: - vcpu A walks the PTs to translate VNCR - before vcpu A is able to grab the MMU lock to insert the TLB, vcpu B updates the S1 PTs with an invalid entry, and issues a TLBI S1E2 for this VA - vcpu A inserts the TLB for something that is now invalid This isn't a new problem, and we manage S2 by having the MMU notifier to bump up mmu_invalidate_seq on invalidation so that the fault can be replayed. We can perform something similar here, and extend invalidate_vncr_va() to update the same counter, clearly indicating that the context has changed under our feet. This is safe as the invalidation always happen while holding the MMU lock for write, and that we sample the sequence number before walking S1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89915 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Remove VM-wide VNCR mapping counter The global VNCR mapping counter is used to decide whether an L1 provided VNCR page is mapped in L0 on any CPU at the point of dealing with a TLB invalidation. It is incremented when a mapping is made in the fixmap, and decremented when unmapped. As it turns out, this tracking has several flaws: - we are trying to invalidate TLBs, and the mapping is only an opportunistic consequence of the TLB. Checking this counter to decide whether a TLB needs to be invalidated may result in missed invalidations. - an L1 vcpu invalidating its own TLB (a very likely case) will not succeed in invalidating the VNCR pseudo TLB because that page is not mapped in L0 at this stage. Given that this tracking fails at delivering the minimum guarantees that are required and is only a performance optimisation, remove it completely. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89914 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Sign-extend VA for range-based TLBI invalidation When the decode_range_tlbi() helper was moved to be used for S1 TLBIs, the required sign extension was omitted. Add it. As a result, special care must be taken to not overflow PA bits when this is used for S2 invalidation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89913 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: take an LPI reference in vgic_v3_save_pending_tables vgic_v3_save_pending_tables() iterates dist->lpi_xa using xa_for_each() and dereferences the returned struct vgic_irq in the loop body without holding a reference on the LPI. The xarray iterator only provides temporary RCU coverage while looking up the current entry. That is not sufficient for this loop body, which reads fields from struct vgic_irq and performs guest memory accesses before the iteration completes. A concurrent path can trigger this race: the irqfd cached injection path (vgic_its_inject_cached_translation) obtains a transient LPI reference via vgic_its_check_cache() without holding kvm->lock, vcpu->mutex, config_lock, or its_lock. If guest ITS DISCARD then drops the cache and ITE references under its_lock, the transient inject reference may become the final one. When vgic_put_irq() drops it, the LPI is erased from lpi_xa and freed via kfree_rcu(). Meanwhile, vgic_v3_save_pending_tables() may still hold a stale pointer obtained from the xarray iterator and dereference it after the RCU grace period completes. Fix this by re-fetching each iterated LPI via vgic_get_irq(), which takes a stable reference, and dropping it with vgic_put_irq() on all paths. This matches the pattern already used by other lpi_xa iterators in the vgic ITS code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89912 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Don't dereference a NULL collection on ITT save MAPC with V=0 drops ite->collection but leaves the ITE on the device's ITT list, and vgic_its_save_ite() dereferences it unconditionally. A guest that issues MAPD, MAPTI and then MAPC(V=0) therefore oopses the host when the VMM issues KVM_DEV_ARM_ITS_SAVE_TABLES to migrate it. That sequence is UNPREDICTABLE per the architecture, but KVM already handles the resulting state in the translate, MOVI and DISCARD paths. Save a zeroed entry, which vgic_its_restore_ite() reads back as invalid. Skipping the ITE instead would leave the ITT slot holding whatever is in guest memory, and restore rejects an entry naming a collection the restored collection table does not have. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89911 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Correctly cap TLBI Range to the architural limit TLB Invalidation by Range has a fairly powerful way of encoding pretty large ranges in a small number of bits. This range can be based on an arbitrary VA, which means it is pretty easy for a guest to generate an overflow should the hypervisor be naive enough to add the range to the base... Make sure the range is capped to the limit dictated by the address bit that determines the VA range. For an IPA invalidation, this is further corrected down the line to ignore the upper range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89910 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Fix uninitialized stack variable issue with dmsintc Variable vector[] is declared on stack in function dmsintc_inject_irq() and sometimes it is used without initialized. Here fix this issue. | ||||