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Search Results (25046 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-54131 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rt2x00: Fix memory leak when handling surveys When removing a rt2x00 device, its associated channel surveys are not freed, causing a memory leak observable with kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff9620f0881a00 (size 512): comm "systemd-udevd", pid 2290, jiffies 4294906974 (age 33.768s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 70 44 12 00 00 00 00 00 92 8a 00 00 00 00 00 00 pD.............. 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ab 87 01 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffffb0ed858b>] __kmalloc+0x4b/0x130 [<ffffffffc1b0f29b>] rt2800_probe_hw+0xc2b/0x1380 [rt2800lib] [<ffffffffc1a9496e>] rt2800usb_probe_hw+0xe/0x60 [rt2800usb] [<ffffffffc1ae491a>] rt2x00lib_probe_dev+0x21a/0x7d0 [rt2x00lib] [<ffffffffc1b3b83e>] rt2x00usb_probe+0x1be/0x980 [rt2x00usb] [<ffffffffc05981e2>] usb_probe_interface+0xe2/0x310 [usbcore] [<ffffffffb13be2d5>] really_probe+0x1a5/0x410 [<ffffffffb13be5c8>] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [<ffffffffb13be6fe>] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [<ffffffffb13be972>] __driver_attach+0xd2/0x1c0 [<ffffffffb13bbc57>] bus_for_each_dev+0x77/0xd0 [<ffffffffb13bd2a2>] bus_add_driver+0x112/0x210 [<ffffffffb13bfc6c>] driver_register+0x5c/0x120 [<ffffffffc0596ae8>] usb_register_driver+0x88/0x150 [usbcore] [<ffffffffb0c011c4>] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x220 [<ffffffffb0d6134c>] do_init_module+0x4c/0x220 Fix this by freeing the channel surveys on device removal. Tested with a RT3070 based USB wireless adapter. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54122 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/dpu: Add check for cstate As kzalloc may fail and return NULL pointer, it should be better to check cstate in order to avoid the NULL pointer dereference in __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/514163/ | ||||
| CVE-2023-54119 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inotify: Avoid reporting event with invalid wd When inotify_freeing_mark() races with inotify_handle_inode_event() it can happen that inotify_handle_inode_event() sees that i_mark->wd got already reset to -1 and reports this value to userspace which can confuse the inotify listener. Avoid the problem by validating that wd is sensible (and pretend the mark got removed before the event got generated otherwise). | ||||
| CVE-2023-54117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dcssblk: fix kernel crash with list_add corruption Commit fb08a1908cb1 ("dax: simplify the dax_device <-> gendisk association") introduced new logic for gendisk association, requiring drivers to explicitly call dax_add_host() and dax_remove_host(). For dcssblk driver, some dax_remove_host() calls were missing, e.g. in device remove path. The commit also broke error handling for out_dax case in device add path, resulting in an extra put_device() w/o the previous get_device() in that case. This lead to stale xarray entries after device add / remove cycles. In the case when a previously used struct gendisk pointer (xarray index) would be used again, because blk_alloc_disk() happened to return such a pointer, the xa_insert() in dax_add_host() would fail and go to out_dax, doing the extra put_device() in the error path. In combination with an already flawed error handling in dcssblk (device_register() cleanup), which needs to be addressed in a separate patch, this resulted in a missing device_del() / klist_del(), and eventually in the kernel crash with list_add corruption on a subsequent device_add() / klist_add(). Fix this by adding the missing dax_remove_host() calls, and also move the put_device() in the error path to restore the previous logic. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54030 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/net: don't overflow multishot recv Don't allow overflowing multishot recv CQEs, it might get out of hand, hurt performance, and in the worst case scenario OOM the task. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54028 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix the error "trying to register non-static key in rxe_cleanup_task" In the function rxe_create_qp(), rxe_qp_from_init() is called to initialize qp, internally things like rxe_init_task are not setup until rxe_qp_init_req(). If an error occurred before this point then the unwind will call rxe_cleanup() and eventually to rxe_qp_do_cleanup()/rxe_cleanup_task() which will oops when trying to access the uninitialized spinlock. If rxe_init_task is not executed, rxe_cleanup_task will not be called. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54023 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between balance and cancel/pause Syzbot reported a panic that looks like this: assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:465 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/messages.c:259! RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x30 fs/btrfs/messages.c:259 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_exclop_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:465 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3564 [inline] btrfs_ioctl+0x531e/0x5b30 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4632 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The reproducer is running a balance and a cancel or pause in parallel. The way balance finishes is a bit wonky, if we were paused we need to save the balance_ctl in the fs_info, but clear it otherwise and cleanup. However we rely on the return values being specific errors, or having a cancel request or no pause request. If balance completes and returns 0, but we have a pause or cancel request we won't do the appropriate cleanup, and then the next time we try to start a balance we'll trip this ASSERT. The error handling is just wrong here, we always want to clean up, unless we got -ECANCELLED and we set the appropriate pause flag in the exclusive op. With this patch the reproducer ran for an hour without tripping, previously it would trip in less than a few minutes. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54034 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Make sure to zero vfio_iommu_type1_info before copying to user Missed a zero initialization here. Most of the struct is filled with a copy_from_user(), however minsz for that copy is smaller than the actual struct by 8 bytes, thus we don't fill the padding. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54022 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential memory leaks at error path for UMP open The allocation and initialization errors at alloc_midi_urbs() that is called at MIDI 2.0 / UMP device are supposed to be handled at the caller side by invoking free_midi_urbs(). However, free_midi_urbs() loops only for ep->num_urbs entries, and since ep->num_entries wasn't updated yet at the allocation / init error in alloc_midi_urbs(), this entry won't be released. The intention of free_midi_urbs() is to release the whole elements, so change the loop size to NUM_URBS to scan over all elements for fixing the missed releases. Also, the call of free_midi_urbs() is missing at snd_usb_midi_v2_open(). Although it'll be released later at reopen/close or disconnection, it's better to release immediately at the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54015 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Devcom, fix error flow in mlx5_devcom_register_device In case devcom allocation is failed, mlx5 is always freeing the priv. However, this priv might have been allocated by a different thread, and freeing it might lead to use-after-free bugs. Fix it by freeing the priv only in case it was allocated by the running thread. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54007 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vmci_host: fix a race condition in vmci_host_poll() causing GPF During fuzzing, a general protection fault is observed in vmci_host_poll(). general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000019: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xf3/0x5e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4926 <- omitting registers -> Call Trace: <TASK> lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5672 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb3/0x100 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 add_wait_queue+0x3d/0x260 kernel/sched/wait.c:22 poll_wait include/linux/poll.h:49 [inline] vmci_host_poll+0xf8/0x2b0 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:174 vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:88 [inline] do_pollfd fs/select.c:873 [inline] do_poll fs/select.c:921 [inline] do_sys_poll+0xc7c/0x1aa0 fs/select.c:1015 __do_sys_ppoll fs/select.c:1121 [inline] __se_sys_ppoll+0x2cc/0x330 fs/select.c:1101 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4e/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Example thread interleaving that causes the general protection fault is as follows: CPU1 (vmci_host_poll) CPU2 (vmci_host_do_init_context) ----- ----- // Read uninitialized context context = vmci_host_dev->context; // Initialize context vmci_host_dev->context = vmci_ctx_create(); vmci_host_dev->ct_type = VMCIOBJ_CONTEXT; if (vmci_host_dev->ct_type == VMCIOBJ_CONTEXT) { // Dereferencing the wrong pointer poll_wait(..., &context->host_context); } In this scenario, vmci_host_poll() reads vmci_host_dev->context first, and then reads vmci_host_dev->ct_type to check that vmci_host_dev->context is initialized. However, since these two reads are not atomically executed, there is a chance of a race condition as described above. To fix this race condition, read vmci_host_dev->context after checking the value of vmci_host_dev->ct_type so that vmci_host_poll() always reads an initialized context. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54006 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Fix data-race around unix_tot_inflight. unix_tot_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but unix_release_sock() reads it locklessly. Let's use READ_ONCE() for unix_tot_inflight. Note that the writer side was marked by commit 9d6d7f1cb67c ("af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress") BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / unix_release_sock write (marked) to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 123 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x130/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:64 unix_attach_fds+0x137/0x1b0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1832 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1955 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2493 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2547 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2576 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2585 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2583 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 4891 on cpu 0: unix_release_sock+0x608/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:671 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1058 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1385 __fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 4891 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 | ||||
| CVE-2023-54002 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix assertion of exclop condition when starting balance Balance as exclusive state is compatible with paused balance and device add, which makes some things more complicated. The assertion of valid states when starting from paused balance needs to take into account two more states, the combinations can be hit when there are several threads racing to start balance and device add. This won't typically happen when the commands are started from command line. Scenario 1: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE. Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and btrfs_exclop_finish executed finishes before assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE state which lead to assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:456 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_exclop_balance+0x13c/0x310 ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0 ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20 btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320 btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0 ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Scenario 2: With exclusive_operation state == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED. Concurrently adding multiple devices to the same mount point and btrfs_exclop_balance executed finish before the latter thread execute assertion in btrfs_exclop_balance, exclusive_operation will changed to BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED state which lead to assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_DEV_ADD || fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_NONE, fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:458 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_exclop_balance+0x240/0x410 ? memdup_user+0xab/0xc0 ? PTR_ERR+0x17/0x20 btrfs_ioctl_add_dev+0x2ee/0x320 btrfs_ioctl+0x9d5/0x10d0 ? btrfs_ioctl_encoded_write+0xb80/0xb80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd An example of the failed assertion is below, which shows that the paused balance is also needed to be checked. root@syzkaller:/home/xsk# ./repro Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.611428][ T7970] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 0 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.613973][ T7971] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.615456][ T7972] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.617528][ T7973] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.618359][ T7974] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.622589][ T7975] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.624034][ T7976] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.626420][ T7977] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.627643][ T7978] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Failed to add device /dev/vda, errno 14 [ 416.629006][ T7979] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 [ 416.630298][ T7980] BTRFS info (device loop0): fs_info exclusive_operation: 3 Fai ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2023-53998 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: virtio - Fix race on data_avail and actual data The virtio rng device kicks off a new entropy request whenever the data available reaches zero. When a new request occurs at the end of a read operation, that is, when the result of that request is only needed by the next reader, then there is a race between the writing of the new data and the next reader. This is because there is no synchronisation whatsoever between the writer and the reader. Fix this by writing data_avail with smp_store_release and reading it with smp_load_acquire when we first enter read. The subsequent reads are safe because they're either protected by the first load acquire, or by the completion mechanism. Also remove the redundant zeroing of data_idx in random_recv_done (data_idx must already be zero at this point) and data_avail in request_entropy (ditto). | ||||
| CVE-2023-54010 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPICA: ACPICA: check null return of ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED in acpi_db_display_objects ACPICA commit 0d5f467d6a0ba852ea3aad68663cbcbd43300fd4 ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED may fails, object_info might be null and will cause null pointer dereference later. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ionic: remove WARN_ON to prevent panic_on_warn Remove unnecessary early code development check and the WARN_ON that it uses. The irq alloc and free paths have long been cleaned up and this check shouldn't have stuck around so long. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53992 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: ocb: don't leave if not joined If there's no OCB state, don't ask the driver/mac80211 to leave, since that's just confusing. Since set/clear the chandef state, that's a simple check. | ||||
| CVE-2023-53991 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/dpu: Disallow unallocated resources to be returned In the event that the topology requests resources that have not been created by the system (because they are typically not represented in dpu_mdss_cfg ^1), the resource(s) in global_state (in this case DSC blocks, until their allocation/assignment is being sanity-checked in "drm/msm/dpu: Reject topologies for which no DSC blocks are available") remain NULL but will still be returned out of dpu_rm_get_assigned_resources, where the caller expects to get an array containing num_blks valid pointers (but instead gets these NULLs). To prevent this from happening, where null-pointer dereferences typically result in a hard-to-debug platform lockup, num_blks shouldn't increase past NULL blocks and will print an error and break instead. After all, max_blks represents the static size of the maximum number of blocks whereas the actual amount varies per platform. ^1: which can happen after a git rebase ended up moving additions to _dpu_cfg to a different struct which has the same patch context. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/517636/ | ||||
| CVE-2022-50698 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: da7219: Fix an error handling path in da7219_register_dai_clks() If clk_hw_register() fails, the corresponding clk should not be unregistered. To handle errors from loops, clean up partial iterations before doing the goto. So add a clk_hw_unregister(). Then use a while (--i >= 0) loop in the unwind section. | ||||
| CVE-2022-50779 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string() When insert and remove the orangefs module, then debug_help_string will be leaked: unreferenced object 0xffff8881652ba000 (size 4096): comm "insmod", pid 1701, jiffies 4294893639 (age 13218.530s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 43 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 44 65 62 75 67 20 4b 65 79 Client Debug Key 77 6f 72 64 73 20 61 72 65 20 75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 words are unknow backtrace: [<0000000004e6f8e3>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0 [<0000000006f75d85>] orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string+0x5e/0x480 [orangefs] [<0000000091270a2a>] _sub_I_65535_1+0x57/0xf70 [crc_itu_t] [<000000004b1ee1a3>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0 [<000000001d0614ae>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320 [<00000000efef068c>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330 [<000000006533b44d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0 [<00000000a0da6f99>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [<000000007790b19b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 When remove the module, should always free debug_help_string. Should always free the allocated buffer when change the free_debug_help_string. | ||||