| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| ArcadeDB (Maven artifact com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine) through 26.8.1 contains an incomplete deny-list in the polyglot script sandbox: com.arcadedb.query.polyglot.HostClassLookupFilter.DENIED lists java.util.ResourceBundle as a bare class name, which is matched by exact equality and therefore does not cover its subclasses, while ScriptTriggerExecutor.ALLOWED_PACKAGES permits java.util.*. A user with the UPDATE_SCHEMA privilege (sufficient to create or alter a JavaScript trigger; no server-admin rights required) can reference java.util.PropertyResourceBundle or java.util.ListResourceBundle and invoke the inherited static ResourceBundle.getBundle(String) to read .properties resources from the application classpath, which the sandbox (IOAccess.NONE, with java.io.**, java.nio.** and java.net.** denied) is intended to make unreachable. This can disclose packaged application configuration such as database credentials and API keys; the advisory states the issue does not provide arbitrary host filesystem read or remote code execution. Fixed in 26.9.1. |
| Imager versions before 1.036 for Perl disclose uninitialised heap memory reading a paletted image with pixel indexes past its colour map in i_gpix_p and i_glin_p.
The palette is allocated uninitialised, and only the entries a reader adds count as populated. The TGA reader stores pixel indexes without checking them against the colour map. i_gpix_p() rejects only an index greater than the count, so an index equal to it reads the first unpopulated entry, and getpixel() returns it.
i_glin_p() skips any index at or beyond the count without writing that pixel to the caller's buffer. The palette-to-RGB conversion reads each row through an uninitialised buffer, so those pixels of the converted image hold prior heap contents.
Reading an attacker-supplied image through Imager->read() and then fetching its pixels or converting it to RGB discloses process heap memory. |
| gptp_handle_msg() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/gptp/gptp.c dereferenced the gPTP header returned by GPTP_HDR() and switched on hdr->message_type without first checking that the received frame carries at least sizeof(struct gptp_hdr) (34) bytes of payload. The header accessor gptp_get_hdr() deliberately never fails for a short buffer — it returns pkt->frags->data and leaves validation to its callers — so a truncated frame produced a header pointer covering memory beyond the received data. The per-message-type checks that follow do not compensate: GPTP_VALID_LEN() reduces to len > 60 once the Ethernet header has been pulled, which is false for every fixed-size gPTP message, so GPTP_CHECK_LEN() never rejects a truncated SYNC, FOLLOWUP, PDELAY_RESP or SIGNALING message.
The defect is reached by an unauthenticated peer on the same link sending an Ethernet frame with ethertype 0x88F7 to the PTP multicast address on an interface configured as a gPTP port, with CONFIG_NET_GPTP enabled. Because conformant Ethernet pads frames to 60 bytes, a payload shorter than 34 bytes generally requires a link that can deliver sub-minimum frames — for example the native_sim TAP driver (drivers/ethernet/eth_native_tap.c), which forwards whatever length the host device supplies, or a MAC configured to accept undersized frames.
The short packet is retained (net_pkt_ref() into rcvd_sync_ptr, rcvd_follow_up_ptr, rcvd_pdelay_resp_ptr or rcvd_announce_ptr) and later parsed by the media-dependent and media-independent state machines in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/gptp/gptp_md.c and subsys/net/l2/ethernet/gptp/gptp_mi.c, which read tens of further bytes and copy some of them (the announce priority vector, hdr->port_id) into state that is subsequently transmitted. Under the default fixed-size buffer allocator (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, 128-byte fragments) the accesses stay inside the allocated fragment and disclose stale recycled buffer contents; under the experimental CONFIG_NET_BUF_VARIABLE_DATA_SIZE allocator, where fragments are heap-allocated at the exact frame length, they are genuine out-of-bounds reads. There is no write and no availability impact. |
| gptp_mi_qualify_announce() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/gptp/gptp_mi.c walks the Path Trace TLV of a received IEEE 802.1AS Announce message, comparing each clock identity against the local one. The loop bound was taken solely from the attacker-controlled wire field announce->steps_removed (accepted up to 254), never from announce->tlv.len, which is the field that states how many identities the TLV actually carries. Because path_sequence is the flexible member of the wire TLV (struct gptp_path_trace_tlv) and GPTP_ANNOUNCE() yields a raw pointer into the received packet buffer, the memcmp() inside the loop can address memory well past the end of the received frame.
The stack's only length validation, GPTP_ANNOUNCE_CHECK_LEN(), requires the received gPTP payload to be exactly 68 + tlv.len bytes — so it does not constrain the loop, it guarantees the data is absent. An unauthenticated attacker on the same Ethernet segment can send a single Announce frame declaring tlv.len = 0 with steps_removed = 254; the frame passes the length check and reception path (net_gptp_recv() → gptp_handle_msg() → gptp_mi_qualify_announce()), which performs no authentication, and the loop then reads 255 entries of 8 bytes each — about 2 KB — beyond the end of the network buffer.
The impact is an out-of-bounds read. The bytes read are only used as a memcmp() operand and are never returned to the attacker, so there is no meaningful information disclosure; the practical risk is that the overread crosses a network buffer pool boundary into unmapped or MPU-protected memory and faults the networking RX thread, causing a denial of service. Exposure is limited to builds that enable the opt-in, experimental CONFIG_NET_GPTP (TSN/AVB deployments) and to attackers with layer-2 adjacency, since gPTP frames are sent to a link-local multicast address and are not routed.
The fix computes the true entry count as tlv.len / GPTP_CLOCK_ID_LEN and rejects the announce when steps_removed + 1 exceeds it, so the loop can no longer run past the data the packet-length check proved present. |
| Buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 153.0.8010.52 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix off-by-one page overflow in ntfs_decompress()
The per-token range check in ntfs_decompress() uses
if (cb >= cb_sb_end || dp_addr > dp_sb_end)
break;
so dp_addr == dp_sb_end falls through to the symbol copy
`*dp_addr++ = *cb++`, writing one byte past the destination page. Since
NTFS_SB_SIZE == PAGE_SIZE the destination is a single page, so the byte
lands in the adjacent page, and *dest_ofs is left one past the sub-block
end (the later `*dest_ofs &= ~PAGE_MASK` then yields 1, not 0, so the page
is never finalized and later sub-blocks keep writing further past it). A
corrupted compressed $DATA attribute thus produces a bounded run of
out-of-bounds writes when the file is read.
Break as soon as dp_addr reaches dp_sb_end; a full sub-block still
completes, as its final copy advances dp_addr to exactly dp_sb_end. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix resize of the RX ring
When a AF_XDP socket is attached, the virtnet_rx_resize
should resize the rq->xsk_buffs XSK buffer array. Otherwise,
when the size grows, the virtnet_rx_resume() causes a write
past the end of the array. This is easily reproducable with
ethtool -G ens3 rx 32
./xdpsock -i eth0 -q 0 -r -z &
ethtool -G eth0 rx 256 |
| A flaw was found in Netty's Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Client. The client fails to verify the 'id-kp-OCSPSigning' Extended Key Usage (EKU) in OCSP responder certificates. A remote attacker, holding any valid certificate issued by the same Certificate Authority (CA), can exploit this by forging 'GOOD' OCSP responses for revoked certificates. This bypasses certificate revocation checks, allowing applications using Netty's OCSP Client to accept certificates that should have been revoked, leading to an authorization bypass. |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A remote attacker could exploit this by sending a specially crafted HTTP request that includes control characters within the chunk-size line. This bypasses the intended strict validation, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP requests. This vulnerability can lead to HTTP request smuggling, potentially resulting in information disclosure or other unauthorized actions. |
| A flaw was found in Netty's HTTP/2 HpackEncoder. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames with a very large MAX_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE. This causes the HpackEncoder to store an excessive number of unique headers, leading to increased CPU usage and memory consumption, ultimately resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). |
| A flaw was found in Netty's WebSocketServerExtensionHandler. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by using HTTP/1.1 pipelining to send requests faster than the application can respond. This leads to an unbounded growth of a per-connection queue, consuming excessive memory. Eventually, this can cause the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to exhaust its heap, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected server. |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A reference-count leak in the HAProxy PROXY-v2 message decoder allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to send specially crafted PROXY-protocol v2 headers. This can lead to memory exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue
gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the
current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit:
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ)
gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ)
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo)
sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug)
sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len
are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32.
Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and
admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel
can be driven to OOM.
Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds
the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and
the stored u32 backlog never wraps.
The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup):
attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB,
leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of
queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len,
or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32,
admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/hsmp: Reject negative power cap writes in hwmon
hsmp_hwmon_write() takes the user-supplied hwmon value as a signed long
and assigns "val / MICROWATT_PER_MILLIWATT" to msg.args[0], which is a
__u32. MICROWATT_PER_MILLIWATT is an unsigned long, so a negative write
to power1_cap (e.g. "echo -1 > power1_cap") is first converted to a huge
unsigned value by the division and then stored into the u32 argument.
As a result a nonsensical, multi-gigawatt socket power limit is sent to
the SMU via HSMP_SET_SOCKET_POWER_LIMIT instead of the write being
rejected.
Reject negative values with -EINVAL before the conversion.
Tested with HSMP enabled:
CAP=$(dirname $(grep -l amd_hsmp_hwmon \
/sys/class/hwmon/hwmon*/name | head -1))/power1_cap
# negative write
echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
# valid positive write must still work
echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
Before:
# echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0 <- accepted; bogus limit sent to SMU
# echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0
After:
# echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
ret=1 <- rejected with -EINVAL
# echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0 <- valid write still works |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix password encoding bounds check
The password PSWD_ENCODINGS parser reads password_obj[elem + pos_values]
while copying the supported password encodings from the ACPI package.
The outer loop only guarantees that elem is within password_obj_count.
The encoding count is bounded by MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE, but that does not
guarantee that the ACPI package contains enough entries for all
elem + pos_values accesses.
A malformed package can therefore declare a non-zero encoding count
without providing enough string objects, causing the parser to read past
the ACPI package array and pass an out-of-bounds string pointer and
length to hp_convert_hexstr_to_str().
Add the same computed-index bounds check used by the other offset-based
package parsing loops before reading password_obj[elem + pos_values]. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.20.0, 3.1.15.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1, A crafted cineon file can supply a numberofelements value greater than the format maximum of eight. cineoninput::open() uses that unchecked value as the loop bound while filling the fixed strings[8] array, writing pointers beyond the stack buffer and into adjacent state, resulting in memory corruption and denial of service. The affected implementation is identified by src/cineon.imageio/cineoninput.cpp, CineonInput::open(), numberOfElements, and strings[8], which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.20.0, 3.1.15.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1. |
| NanoMQ is an MQTT broker. Prior to 0.24.14, NanoMQ's broker-side MQTT v5 nmq_subinfo_decode() function in nng/src/sp/protocol/mqtt/mqtt_parser.c reuses len_of_varint from the outer Properties Length while parsing each SUBSCRIPTION_IDENTIFIER. A remote client can send a SUBSCRIBE packet with a multi-byte Properties Length and repeated subscription identifiers, causing get_var_integer() to begin at an incorrect offset and read beyond the heap message buffer. The flaw is reachable through the broker receive path and can crash the broker, while the separately reported topic-option off-by-one occurs later and is not this vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 0.24.14. |
| A vulnerability was identified in Totolink A3002MU Hh-B20211125.1046. Affected is the function formWlEncrypt of the file /boafrm/formWlEncrypt. The manipulation of the argument submit-url leads to buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. |
| On affected platforms running Arista EOS with Open Shortest Path First version 3 (OSPFv3) configured, a specially crafted packet can cause the OSPFv3 agent to restart unexpectedly. |
| node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. Prior to node-opcua-client 2.145.0, the internal fieldsToJson method in packages/node-opcua-client/source/alarms_and_conditions/client_alarm.ts directly assigns unsanitized field names and allows a __proto__.pollutedKey path to modify Object.prototype. Successful exploitation requires an application to expose attacker-controlled event fields to fieldsToJson and may cause denial of service or application logic corruption. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.145.0. |
