| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Incorrect authorization in Passwords in Google Chrome on on iOS prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Incorrect authorization in Scheduling in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Missing authorization in Network in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| ProPhoenix Law RMS v2022.2403.3.101 was discovered to contain a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the PageTitle/Alert/MsgType parameter in the errorHandler.aspx endpoint. |
| A flaw has been found in HBAI-Ltd Toonflow-app up to 1.1.8. The affected element is the function child_process.exec of the file src/routes/setting/fileManagement/openFolder.ts of the component Open Folder Endpoint. Executing a manipulation of the argument path can lead to command injection. The attack needs to be launched locally. The exploit has been published and may be used. Upgrading to version 2.0.0 is sufficient to fix this issue. You should upgrade the affected component. The vendor explains: "The report targets ToonFlow version 1.1.8. The current release is 2.0.4, which is the result of a substantial architectural refactor; the code paths referenced in the report do not apply to the current version. The report does not describe a vulnerability in any supported release." |
| FreeRDP 3.0.0-beta1 before 3.32.0 on Unix builds with PKCS#11 support has a stack-based buffer overflow in wprintKeyName() in WinPR's NCrypt PKCS#11 provider. It hex-encodes a key's CKA_ID, which can be up to 64 bytes, into a fixed 128-byte stack buffer. An attacker supplying a malicious PKCS#11 token or module whose key and matching certificate use a 55- to 64-byte CKA_ID can overflow the client's stack during key enumeration, causing a crash. |
| FreeRDP 3.0.0 before 3.32.0 contains a heap use-after-free vulnerability in smartcard emulation when SCARD_IOCTL_DISCONNECT and SCARD_IOCTL_TRANSMIT operate concurrently on one card handle. A malicious RDP server can overlap these IRPs through separate context workers to free and reuse the SCardHandle, causing client-process heap corruption and termination. |
| FreeRDP 3.0.0-beta1 before 3.32.0, when built with verbose WinPR assertions and using smartcard emulation, has a reachable assertion: the emulated SCardStatusA passes a NULL reader-name destination to scard_copy_strings. A malicious RDP server can send an SCardStatusA request with fmszReaderNamesIsNULL=1 to abort a connecting client. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: aggregator: fix a potential use-after-free
On error we free aggr->lookups->dev_id before removing the entry from
the lookup table. If a concurrent thread calls gpiod_find() before we
remove the entry, it could iterate over the list and call
gpiod_match_lookup_table() which unconditionally dereferences dev_id
when calling strcmp(). Reverse the order of cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: aggregator: remove the software node when deactivating the aggregator
The dynamic software node we create for the aggregator platform device
when using configfs is leaked when the device is deactivated. Destroy it
as the last step in the tear-down path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Fix exec_queue leak on width check in stream open
In xe_oa_stream_open_ioctl(), when param.exec_q->width > 1 the
function returns -EOPNOTSUPP directly, skipping the existing
err_exec_q cleanup path. The exec_queue reference obtained by
xe_exec_queue_lookup() is leaked.
The exec queue holds a reference on the xe_file, which is only
dropped during queue teardown. The leaked lookup ref is not on
the file's exec_queue xarray, so file close cannot release it.
This keeps both the exec queue and the file private state pinned
indefinitely.
Jump to err_exec_q instead of returning directly so the reference
is released.
(cherry picked from commit 339fa0be9e4a5d69fa47e91f4a36574224fb478f) |
| An issue in libass v.0.17.5 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the ass_outline_construct() in libass/ass_render.c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix durable reconnect error path file lifetime
After a durable reconnect succeeds, ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() republishes
the same ksmbd_file into the session volatile-id table. If smb2_open()
then takes a later error path, cleanup first calls ksmbd_fd_put(work, fp)
and then unconditionally calls ksmbd_put_durable_fd(dh_info.fp).
In this case fp and dh_info.fp are the same object. The first put drops the
reconnect lookup reference, but the final durable put can run
__ksmbd_close_fd(NULL, fp). Because the final close is not session-aware,
it can free the file object without removing the volatile-id entry that was
just published into the session table.
Use the session-aware put for the final reconnect drop when the reconnect
had already succeeded and the error path is cleaning up the republished
file. Earlier reconnect failures, before fp is assigned to dh_info.fp, keep
using the durable-only put path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size
nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len)
and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.
Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data()
callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.
A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.
Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: module: avoid leaking a netdev ref on module flash errors
module_flash_fw_schedule() is missing undo for setting
the "in_progress" flag and taking the netdev reference.
Delay taking these, the device can't disappear while
we are holding rtnl_lock. |
| Gitea's OAuth2 token endpoint verified the signature and grant of a token submitted with the `refresh_token` grant type, but not that the token was a refresh token. An unexpired access token for the same OAuth2 application and grant could be exchanged for a new access token and refresh token. Whoever holds such an access token could keep access beyond the token's original lifetime. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: module: call ethnl_ops_complete() on module flash errors
When validate() fails we are skipping over ethnl_ops_complete()
even tho we already called ethnl_ops_begin(). |
| When migrating a repository from another Gitea instance, Gitea used the page size reported in the source server's API settings to end its paginated downloads. A source that reported `max_response_items` as `0` made these loops run indefinitely and grow server memory until it was exhausted. Any user who can migrate repositories could point a migration at a server they control and cause a denial of service. |
| The Gitea web route for deleting tags (`POST /{owner}/{repo}/tags/delete`) requires only write access to the Code unit, but shares its handler with release deletion and did not check that the target was a plain tag. A collaborator with Code write access and without Releases write access could permanently delete published releases of that repository, including their attachments. Protected tag rules covering the release tag still blocked the deletion. |
| The Gitea API routes for issue attachments (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/assets/{attachment_id}`) also accepted attachments that belong to comments on the issue. Because the author of an issue may edit and delete the issue's attachments, a user who opened an issue could rename or delete attachments that other users had posted in comments on that issue. The contents of the attachments could not be changed. |
