| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Validate cpu_id against nr_cpu_ids in DMAH alloc
The cpu_id attribute supplied by user space through
UVERBS_ATTR_ALLOC_DMAH_CPU_ID is passed directly to cpumask_test_cpu()
without first verifying that the value is within the valid CPU range.
Passing such untrusted data to cpumask_test_cpu() may lead to an
out-of-bounds read of the underlying cpumask bitmap: the helper expands
to a test_bit() that indexes the bitmap by cpu_id / BITS_PER_LONG with
no bound check.
In addition, on kernels built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS it trips
the WARN_ON_ONCE() in cpumask_check(); combined with panic_on_warn this
turns a bad user input into a machine reboot.
Reject any cpu_id that is not smaller than nr_cpu_ids with -EINVAL
before it is used.
Reported by Smatch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length
srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len,
where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target
and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received
(wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so
at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded.
A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that
the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with
SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer
is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the
sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len
near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults.
Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if
the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within
the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The
in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by
wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: allow subflow rcv wnd to shrink
In MPTCP connection, the `window` field in the TCP header refers to the
MPTCP-level rcv_nxt and it's right edge should not move backward. Such
constraint is enforced at DSS option generation time.
At the same time, the TCP stack ensures independently that the TCP-level
rcv wnd right's edge does not move backward. That in turn causes artificial
inflating of the MPTCP rcv window when the incoming data is acked at the
TCP level and is OoO in the MPTCP sequence space (or lands in the backlog).
As a consequence, the incoming traffic can exceed the receiver rcvbuf size
even when the sender is not misbehaving.
Prevent such scenario forcibly allowing the TCP subflow to shrink the
TCP-level rcv wnd regardless of the current netns setting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ethosu: fix IFM region index out-of-bounds in command stream parser
NPU_SET_IFM_REGION extracts the region index with param & 0x7f, giving
a maximum value of 127. However region_size[] and output_region[] in
struct ethosu_validated_cmdstream_info are both sized to
NPU_BASEP_REGION_MAX (8), giving valid indices [0..7].
Every other region assignment in the same switch uses param & 0x7:
NPU_SET_OFM_REGION: st.ofm.region = param & 0x7;
NPU_SET_IFM2_REGION: st.ifm2.region = param & 0x7;
NPU_SET_WEIGHT_REGION: st.weight[0].region = param & 0x7;
NPU_SET_SCALE_REGION: st.scale[0].region = param & 0x7;
The 0x7f mask on IFM is inconsistent and appears to be a typo.
feat_matrix_length() and calc_sizes() use the region index directly
as an array subscript into the kzalloc'd info struct:
info->region_size[fm->region] = max(...);
A userspace caller supplying NPU_SET_IFM_REGION with param > 7 causes
a write up to 127*8 = 1016 bytes past the start of region_size[],
corrupting adjacent kernel heap data.
Fix by applying the same & 0x7 mask used by all other region
assignments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ethosu: fix arithmetic issues in dma_length()
dma_length() derives DMA region usage from command stream values and
updates region_size[]:
len = ((len + stride[0]) * size0 + stride[1]) * size1
region_size[region] = max(..., len + dma->offset)
Several arithmetic issues can corrupt the derived region size:
- signed stride values may underflow when added to len
- intermediate multiplications may overflow
- len + dma->offset may overflow during region_size updates
- dma_length() error returns were not validated by the caller
region_size[] is later used by ethosu_job.c to validate command stream
accesses against GEM buffer sizes. Arithmetic wraparound can therefore
under-report region usage and bypass the bounds validation.
Fix by validating signed additions, using overflow helpers for
multiplications and offset updates, and propagating dma_length()
failures to the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ethosu: reject DMA commands with uninitialized length
cmd_state_init() initializes the command state with memset(0xff),
leaving dma->len at U64_MAX to signal missing setup. The only setter
is NPU_SET_DMA0_LEN; if userspace omits this command and issues
NPU_OP_DMA_START, dma->len remains U64_MAX.
In dma_length(), a positive stride added to U64_MAX wraps to a small
value. With size0 == 1, check_mul_overflow() does not trigger and
dma_length() returns 0 instead of U64_MAX. The caller's U64_MAX check
then passes, region_size[] stays 0, and the bounds check in
ethosu_job.c is bypassed, allowing hardware to execute DMA with stale
physical addresses.
Fix by checking for U64_MAX at the start of dma_length() before any
arithmetic, consistent with the sentinel value used throughout the
driver to detect uninitialized fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast
tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to
protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation
is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal
XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is
shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of-
bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation.
Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate
it against the expected struct size before each cast. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: require Ethernet MAC header before using eth_hdr()
`ip6t_eui64`, `xt_mac`, the `bitmap:ip,mac`, `hash:ip,mac`, and
`hash:mac` ipset types, and `nf_log_syslog` access `eth_hdr(skb)`
after either assuming that the skb is associated with an Ethernet
device or checking only that the `ETH_HLEN` bytes at
`skb_mac_header(skb)` lie between `skb->head` and `skb->data`.
Make these paths first verify that the skb is associated with an
Ethernet device, that the MAC header was set, and that it spans at
least a full Ethernet header before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix OOB in pcpu_init_value
An out-of-bounds read occurs when copying element from a
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE map to another pcpu map with the
same value_size that is not rounded up to 8 bytes.
The issue happens when:
1. A CGROUP_STORAGE map is created with value_size not aligned to
8 bytes (e.g., 4 bytes)
2. A pcpu map is created with the same value_size (e.g., 4 bytes)
3. Update element in 2 with data in 1
pcpu_init_value assumes that all sources are rounded up to 8 bytes,
and invokes copy_map_value_long to make a data copy, However, the
assumption doesn't stand since there are some cases where the source
may not be rounded up to 8 bytes, e.g., CGROUP_STORAGE, skb->data.
the verifier verifies exactly the size that the source claims, not
the size rounded up to 8 bytes by kernel, an OOB happens when the
source has only 4 bytes while the copy size(4) is rounded up to 8. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc/tegra: cbb: Fix incorrect ARRAY_SIZE in fabric lookup tables
Fix incorrect ARRAY_SIZE usage in fabric lookup tables which could
cause out-of-bounds access during target timeout lookup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: validate qr_numregions in dlm_match_regions()
Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: fix two bugs in dlm_match_regions()".
In dlm_match_regions(), the qr_numregions field from a DLM_QUERY_REGION
network message is used to drive loops over the qr_regions buffer without
sufficient validation. This series fixes two issues:
- Patch 1 adds a bounds check to reject messages where qr_numregions
exceeds O2NM_MAX_REGIONS. The o2net layer only validates message
byte length; it does not constrain field values, so a crafted message
can set qr_numregions up to 255 and trigger out-of-bounds reads past
the 1024-byte qr_regions buffer.
- Patch 2 fixes an off-by-one in the local-vs-remote comparison loop,
which uses '<=' instead of '<', reading one entry past the valid range
even when qr_numregions is within bounds.
This patch (of 2):
The qr_numregions field from a DLM_QUERY_REGION network message is used
directly as loop bounds in dlm_match_regions() without checking against
O2NM_MAX_REGIONS. Since qr_regions is sized for at most O2NM_MAX_REGIONS
(32) entries, a crafted message with qr_numregions > 32 causes
out-of-bounds reads past the qr_regions buffer.
Add a bounds check for qr_numregions before entering the loops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate bg_bits during freefrag scan
[BUG]
A crafted filesystem can trigger an out-of-bounds bitmap walk when
OCFS2_IOC_INFO is issued with OCFS2_INFO_FL_NON_COHERENT.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in test_bit_le include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:21 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:495 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_bitmap fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:588 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_handle_freefrag fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:662 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_handle_request+0x1c66/0x3370 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:754
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888031bce000 by task syz.0.636/1435
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbe/0x130 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xd1/0x650 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xfb/0x140 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x11c/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
test_bit_le include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:21 [inline]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:495 [inline]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_bitmap fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:588 [inline]
ocfs2_info_handle_freefrag fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:662 [inline]
ocfs2_info_handle_request+0x1c66/0x3370 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:754
ocfs2_info_handle+0x18d/0x2a0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:828
ocfs2_ioctl+0x632/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:913
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain() uses on-disk bg_bits directly as the
bitmap scan limit. The coherent path reads group descriptors through
ocfs2_read_group_descriptor(), which validates the descriptor before
use. The non-coherent path uses ocfs2_read_blocks_sync() instead and
skips that validation, so an impossible bg_bits value can drive the
bitmap walk past the end of the block.
[FIX]
Compute the bitmap capacity from the filesystem format with
ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(), report descriptors whose bg_bits exceeds
that limit, and clamp the scan to the computed capacity. This keeps the
freefrag report going while avoiding reads beyond the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fix off-by-one in check_imm signed range check
check_imm(bits, imm) is used in the arm64 BPF JIT to verify that
a branch displacement (in arm64 instruction units) fits into the
signed N-bit immediate field of a B, B.cond or CBZ/CBNZ encoding
before it is handed to the encoder. The macro currently tests for
(imm > 0 && imm >> bits) || (imm < 0 && ~imm >> bits) which admits
values in [-2^N, 2^N) — effectively a signed (N+1)-bit range. A
signed N-bit field only holds [-2^(N-1), 2^(N-1)), so the check
admits one extra bit of range on each side.
In particular, for check_imm19(), values in [2^18, 2^19) slip past
the check but do not fit into the 19-bit signed imm19 field of
B.cond. aarch64_insn_encode_immediate() then masks the raw value
into the 19-bit field, setting bit 18 (the sign bit) and flipping
a forward branch into a backward one. Same class of issue exists
for check_imm26() and the B/BL encoding. Shift by (bits - 1)
instead of bits so the actual signed N-bit range is enforced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: avoid double drm_exec_fini() in userq validate
When new_addition is true, amdgpu_userq_vm_validate() calls
drm_exec_fini(&exec) before iterating over the collected HMM ranges and
calling amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages().
If amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages() fails in that path, the code jumps to
unlock_all and calls drm_exec_fini(&exec) a second time on the same
exec object. drm_exec_fini() is not idempotent: it frees exec->objects
and may also drop exec->contended and finalize the ww acquire context.
Route that error path directly to the range cleanup once exec has
already been finalized.
Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and confirmed by code review.
(cherry picked from commit 2802952e4a07306da6ebe813ff1acacc5691851a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()
On 32-bit architectures, the infinite loop is as follows:
len = p->ErrorDataLength == 0xfffffff8
u8 *next = p->ErrorContextData + len
next == p
On 32-bit architectures, the out-of-bounds read is as follows:
len = p->ErrorDataLength == 0xfffffff0
u8 *next = p->ErrorContextData + len
next == (u8 *)p - 8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virt: sev-guest: Do not use host-controlled page order in cleanup path
When issuing an extended guest request (SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST),
get_ext_report() allocates a buffer to retrieve a certificate blob from the
host, keeping track of its size in report_req->certs_len.
However, the host may return SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN, indicating
an invalid buffer size, as well as the expected length of such buffer.
get_ext_report() subsequently updates report_req->certs_len with the
host-controlled value, and cleans up the buffer by computing a page order
from such value. This is incorrect, as the host-provided length may not
match the page order of the original allocation, potentially resulting
in corruption in the page allocator.
Fix this by using alloc_pages_exact() instead, and reusing @npages to
compute the size passed to free_pages_exact(). For consistency, also
use @npages to compute the size when allocating the pages, even though
this last change has no functional effect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in osdmap_decode()
When decoding osd_state and osd_weight from an incoming osdmap in
osdmap_decode(), both are decoded for each osd, i.e., map->max_osd
times. The ceph_decode_need() check only accounts for
sizeof(*map->osd_weight) once. This can potentially result in an
out-of-bounds memory access if the incoming message is corrupted such
that the max_osd value exceeds the actual content of the osdmap message.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the corresponding part in the
ceph_decode_need() check to account for
map->max_osd*sizeof(*map->osd_weight). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in decode_choose_args()
A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains an OSD map that itself
contains a CRUSH map. When decoding this CRUSH map in crush_decode(), an
array of max_buckets CRUSH buckets is decoded, where some indices may
not refer to actual buckets and are therefore set to NULL. The received
CRUSH map may optionally contain choose_args that get decoded in
decode_choose_args(). When decoding a crush_choose_arg_map, a series of
choose_args for different buckets is decoded, with the bucket_index
being read from the incoming message. It is only checked that the bucket
index does not exceed max_buckets, but not that it doesn't point to an
index with a NULL bucket. If a (potentially corrupted) message contains
a crush_choose_arg_map including such a bucket_index, a null pointer
dereference may occur in the subsequent processing when attempting to
access the bucket with the given index.
This patch fixes the issue by extending the affected check. Now, it is
only attempted to access the bucket if it is not NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in __ceph_x_decrypt()
In __ceph_x_decrypt(), a part of the buffer p is interpreted as a
ceph_x_encrypt_header, and the magic field of this struct is accessed.
This happens without any guarantee that the buffer is large enough to
hold this struct. The function parameter ciphertext_len represents the
length of the ciphertext to decrypt and is guaranteed to be at most the
remaining size of the allocated buffer p. However, this value is not
necessarily greater than sizeof(ceph_x_encrypt_header). E.g., a message
frame of type FRAME_TAG_AUTH_REPLY_MORE, that is just as long to hold
the ciphertext at its end with a ciphertext_len of 8 or less, can
trigger an out-of-bounds memory access when accessing hdr->magic.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to ensure that the
decrypted plaintext in the buffer is large enough to represent at least
the ceph_x_encrypt_header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in crush_decode()
A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP containing a crush map with at least
one bucket has two fields holding the bucket algorithm. If the values
in these two fields differ, an out-of-bounds access can occur. This is
the case because the first algorithm field (alg) is used to allocate
the correct amount of memory for a bucket of this type, while the second
algorithm field inside the bucket (b->alg) is used in the subsequent
processing.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check that compares alg and
b->alg and aborts the processing in case they differ. Furthermore,
b->alg is set to 0 in this case, because the destruction of the crush
map also uses this field to determine the bucket type, which can again
result in an out-of-bounds access when trying to free the memory pointed
to by the fields of the bucket. To correctly free the memory allocated
for the bucket in such a case, the corresponding call to kfree is moved
from the algorithm-specific crush_destroy_bucket functions to the
generic crush_destroy_bucket(). |
