| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: spear: initialize IRQ state before requesting alarm IRQ
devm_request_irq() enables the interrupt before it returns, so the handler
may run while probe is still initializing the device. Initialize the MMIO
address and spinlock before requesting the alarm IRQ. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: generalize pending status bit
Rename NF_FLOW_HW_PENDING to NF_FLOW_PENDING and use it to inhibit the
flowtable GC worker until pending hw offload work has been completed.
Apparently, nf_flow_offload_stats() can schedule work to retrieve stats
while the flow is being removed by GC.
And this bit can also be used in a follow up patch to disable GC until
the flow has been fully added in both directions.
Revert the reordering done in commit d644b23afe1e ("netfilter:
flowtable: publish HW_DEAD after worker is done") to prevent a race
between GC and hw offload handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: connect the session socket without rfcomm_mutex
An RFCOMM connect() issued while a BR/EDR link is being authenticated
makes lockdep report a circular dependency, and the reported cycle is a
real AB/BA between rfcomm_mutex and hdev->lock.
rfcomm_security_cfm() is called from the HCI event path, which already
holds hdev->lock:
hci_rx_work()
hci_event_packet()
hci_cc_read_enc_key_size() [hdev->lock]
hci_encrypt_cfm() [hci_cb_list_lock]
rfcomm_security_cfm() [rfcomm_mutex]
while an RFCOMM connect() from userspace takes the same two locks the
other way round:
rfcomm_sock_connect()
rfcomm_dlc_open() [rfcomm_mutex]
__rfcomm_dlc_open()
rfcomm_session_create()
kernel_connect()
l2cap_sock_connect()
l2cap_chan_connect() [hdev->lock]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
kworker/u131:1/1128 is trying to acquire lock:
rfcomm_mutex, at: rfcomm_security_cfm+0x31/0x3e0 [rfcomm]
but task is already holding lock:
hci_cb_list_lock, at: hci_cc_read_enc_key_size+0x1d2/0xcc0
Chain exists of:
rfcomm_mutex --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock
hci_auth_complete_evt() and hci_encrypt_change_evt() reach the callback
the same way.
Both orders have to be seen in the same boot, which is why a BR/EDR
connection alone is not enough to show it: a session set up by the
remote side is created by rfcomm_accept_connection() in krfcommd, which
calls kernel_accept() and never takes hdev->lock under rfcomm_mutex.
Connecting a device that authenticates and encrypts the link and then
calling connect() on an RFCOMM socket towards any address - the connect
does not have to succeed, the order is recorded before the page timeout
- reports it every time.
Only the session socket has to be connected with the lock held, and it
does not: nothing else can see the socket before it is put on the
session list. So connect it first and take rfcomm_mutex afterwards,
which removes the rfcomm_mutex -> hdev->lock order for good, rather
than keeping the HCI event path out of rfcomm_mutex.
rfcomm_session_create() becomes rfcomm_session_connect(), which returns
the connected socket without touching the session list, and
rfcomm_dlc_open() adds the session once it holds the lock again. If
another opener added a session for the same pair while this socket was
connecting, that session is used and this socket is dropped.
__rfcomm_dlc_open() now takes the session it should use, and its state
check runs after the lock is re-acquired, so a DLC that was opened or
closed in the meantime is still handled.
Over an existing ACL link the connection can complete before the
session reaches the list, and the wakeup from the socket callback is
then lost, so krfcommd is woken once the session is visible.
Connecting without the lock opens a window in which the socket can be
closed. The DLC is not on a session yet, so rfcomm_dlc_close() finds
nothing to do and returns without touching it, and rfcomm_dlc_open()
would then attach a DLC whose owner is gone. rfcomm_dlc_close() now
marks such a DLC with RFCOMM_CLOSED, and rfcomm_dlc_open() checks the
mark once it holds rfcomm_mutex again and drops the socket instead of
attaching the DLC. The mark is cleared when an open starts, so a DLC
that is reused is not affected. This covers both callers of
rfcomm_dlc_open(), the socket and the tty layer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them
memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before
rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then
silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject
is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued
handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes
card->mrq_complete.
Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core:
wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal:
memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in
flush_workqueue():
INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds.
Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check
__wait_for_common
memstick_check
INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds.
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
__flush_workqueue
memstick_remove_host
rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove
Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req,
and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without
touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling
it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new
request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.
The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves
host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do,
and it would now race with handle_req. |
| A race condition in Epiphany allows a malicious website to bypass the TLS/SSL certificate warning page.
Epiphany registers the main-world script message handler "tlsErrorPage" so its internal TLS error page can implement "Accept Risk and Proceed". The handler was registered immediately before loading the error page, leaving a brief window where the previously loaded untrusted origin could still call window.webkit.messageHandlers.tlsErrorPage.postMessage(...). The only authorization check compares a numeric WebKit page id that increments predictably; an attacker can burst-guess ids and approve a certificate exception with no user click.
If a victim visits malicious site A that redirects to site B with an invalid certificate, site A can, for a few milliseconds, disable TLS certificate error warnings for host B until Epiphany is restarted, enabling man-in-the-middle or site spoofing for that host.
Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978
Proof of concept: https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html
Fix: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245 (register handlers on LOAD_COMMITTED). No fixed release tagged yet; reporter and maintainer describe all current versions as affected. Maintainer notes the risky registration timing dates to commit 1da1caed (Epiphany 45.x era); before that the handlers were always registered and similarly reachable from web content. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: Fix unlocked list_del in drm_bridge_add()
When re-adding a bridge that was previously removed, drm_bridge_add()
drops it from bridge_lingering_list without holding bridge_lock.
Both bridge_list and bridge_lingering_list are protected by bridge_lock,
as they are concurrently modified by drm_bridge_remove() and
__drm_bridge_free(), and walked by the debugfs 'bridges' file. Running
the list_empty() test and the list_del_init() outside of the lock may
therefore corrupt either list.
Perform both under bridge_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: check a submount for references right before unmounting it
shrink_submounts() and mark_mounts_for_expiry() first collect all the
mounts they are allowed to unmount and then unmount them.
Whether a mount is busy is decided by propagate_mount_busy() on the
tree. But unmounting the first mount changes the tree that the second
one propagates into. propagate_umount()
moves a surviving overmount off a copy it unmounts and mounts it where
the copy was mounted. If that's where the propagated copy of the second
victim is looked up the overmount becomes a candidate of the second
umount_tree(). It's childless and so trim_one() commits it without
looking at its reference count.
So a synchronous umount pulls out a busy mount that is in use somewhere
else and marks it MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT while it has users:
umount2(/tmp/plshrink/p1, 0) = 0 errno 0
cwd is (unreachable)
The same two umounts requested one after the other fail with EBUSY.
This needs a mount with MNT_SHRINKABLE, i.e., automounted submounts of
NFS, AFS and CIFS or the tracefs mount below debugfs. Bind mounts
inherit the flag.
Check each mount right before it is unmounted under the same hold of
namespace_sem and mount_lock as the umount itself. Make sure that the
algorithm stays linear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix soft lockup in the netlink flow dump
A production compute node carrying a few thousand datapath flows hit a
soft lockup inside a single netlink flow dump and panicked.
ovs_flow_cmd_dump() calls ovs_flow_stats_get() for every flow it
emits, and that releases stats->lock with spin_unlock_bh() once per
CPU that has touched the flow. Every release is a local_bh_enable(),
and each one runs the pending softirq backlog in the dumping thread's
own context.
The skb bounds the flows one callback emits, but not the softirq work
it absorbs. On a CPU that carries the box's packet load the backlog
refills as fast as it drains, so the dumping thread becomes that CPU's
softirq engine. It never sleeps and it has no reschedule point, so
under voluntary preemption nothing can take the CPU away from it:
neither the ksoftirqd the kernel woke to take the work over, nor the
stopper thread the softlockup detector dispatches to refresh its
timestamp.
Hold BH off across the whole callback instead, the way
ctnetlink_dump_table() does, so the nested spin_unlock_bh() stop
draining softirqs. The loop already runs under rcu_read_lock() and
cannot sleep. What it gives up is preemption under CONFIG_PREEMPT,
since a BH-off region is not preemptible outside PREEMPT_RT. The
region stays short: the skb caps the flows one callback emits, and
empty buckets cost no skb space but are each visited once per dump, as
the cursor only moves forward. The table grows on insert and shrinks
only on flush, so the walk is bounded by the largest flow count the
datapath has held. The softirq backlog the callback used to absorb has
no bound at all. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: Fix add_key() race with keyring restriction
__key_create_or_update() snapshots keyring->restrict_link before taking
the destination keyring's semaphore. keyring_restrict() installs a
restriction while holding that semaphore.
This allows a writer to observe no restriction, wait for the keyring
owner to install a reject-all restriction and return successfully, and
then link a key using the stale NULL snapshot. The writer only needs
write permission on the destination keyring.
Move the restrict_link read after __key_link_lock() and
__key_link_begin(). The read and the subsequent restriction check are
then serialized with restriction installation by keyring->sem.
The race was reproduced on v7.2.8 in 19 executions where restriction
installation returned before the link completed. All 19 linked the key
despite the reject-all restriction. With this change, 312 executions
reached the same ordering and every add_key() call failed with -EPERM.
The issue was found by manual concurrency analysis assisted by AI-based
analysis and independently verified with a QEMU reproducer and kernel
instrumentation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: do not warn on route notification size race
fib6_info_hw_flags_set() sizes the skb with rt6_nlmsg_size() and later
fills it with rt6_fill_node(). With nexthop compatibility mode enabled,
a concurrent replacement can grow the group between these independent
snapshots. rt6_fill_node() can then legitimately return -EMSGSIZE, so
the warning does not prove a sizing bug.
Remove the warning. The existing error path still frees the skb and
reports the error to listeners. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: stop route notification sizing when nexthop group shrinks
Commit 680aea08e78c ("net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib
hardware flags are changed") added an RCU-only fib_nlmsg_size() call
for asynchronous hardware flag notifications.
fib_nlmsg_size() checks fib_info_num_path() before each iteration,
then fib_info_nhc() independently reloads nh->nh_grp. If
RTM_NEWNEXTHOP replaces a group with fewer paths between those loads,
fib_info_nhc() returns NULL and fib_nexthop_nlmsg_size() dereferences
it.
Stop sizing when the indexed path is absent. Nexthop groups are
dense, so the current snapshot has no later path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: stop PMTU walk when nexthop group shrinks
Commit 7d3f3b4367f3 ("net: ipv4: Cache pmtu for all packet paths if
multipath enabled") made __ip_rt_update_pmtu() update every path.
For nexthop objects, fib_info_num_path() and fib_info_nhc()
independently load nh->nh_grp. RCU protects each group's lifetime but
does not make the loads observe the same group. If replacement shrinks
the group after the loop accepts an index, fib_info_nhc() returns NULL
and update_or_create_fnhe() dereferences it.
A deterministic probe only widened the existing window between the real
operations. On v7.2, an RTM_NEWNEXTHOP replacement published a
one-member group after the PMTU reader accepted index 1 from a two-member
group, producing:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: update_or_create_fnhe+0x45/0x15b0
Stop when the indexed path is absent. Groups are dense, so no later
index exists in that snapshot. The same real-writer window completed
114,423 PMTU iterations without an oops with this check. A reproducer
is available on request.
Replacement requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the network namespace. Where
unprivileged user namespaces are permitted, a local user can obtain it
in a new user and network namespace. |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.2.2, an attacker overbooks an agent, placing multiple appointments into a single time slot that the system is designed to keep exclusive. The number of overlapping appointments equals the number of concurrent requests, and one booking token is enough because the token is consumed after the insert. This results in the integrity of the booking-calendar breaking and availability being denied to other clients. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2. |
| The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive.
When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer.
The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data.
Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region. |
| The Infineon PSOC 6 BLESS HCI driver in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_infineon_psoc6_bless.c stored the outgoing HCI packet descriptor in a file-scope variable, static cy_stc_ble_hci_tx_packet_info_t hci_tx_pkt. psoc6_bless_send() cleared and populated that descriptor's packetType, dataLength and data fields before acquiring psoc6_bless_operation_sem, so the driver's serialising semaphore protected only the call into Cy_BLE_SoftHciSendAppPkt() and not the shared state that call reads.
The Bluetooth host does not guarantee a single HCI sender. Most transmissions are funnelled through the cooperative TX-processor work queue, but bt_hci_cmd_send() deliberately bypasses bt_dev.cmd_tx_queue for BT_HCI_OP_HOST_NUM_COMPLETED_PACKETS and calls bt_send() directly from the caller's thread; that caller is bt_hci_host_num_completed_packets(), the acl_in_pool destroy callback, which runs on whichever thread drops the last reference to a received ACL buffer. CONFIG_BT_HCI_ACL_FLOW_CONTROL defaults to y on this driver's boards, and an application that returns -EINPROGRESS from its L2CAP recv callback and later calls bt_l2cap_chan_recv_complete() performs that unref from its own preemptible thread. A remote peer that generates Bluetooth traffic concurrently with the device's own transmissions raises the collision rate.
When two senders interleave, the semaphore holder can hand the controller a descriptor whose dataLength comes from one net_buf and whose data pointer comes from another — or one whose buffer has already been returned to its pool. The controller then copies and transmits up to a full HCI/ACL payload starting at a shorter or recycled buffer, disclosing adjacent RAM contents to the connected peer; other interleavings duplicate one HCI packet and silently drop another, disrupting the link. The driver only reads through the shared descriptor, so no memory corruption or write primitive results, and the disclosed bytes are not attacker-chosen. The fix makes the descriptor a local variable in psoc6_bless_send(), removing the shared state; Cy_BLE_SoftHciSendAppPkt() copies the packet before returning, so it need not outlive the call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7603: initialize global station WCID
mt7603 uses a driver-private global station WCID for frames that have
neither a station nor a vif, including frames injected through a monitor
interface. Unlike the core global WCID initialized by
mt76_register_device(), this WCID is published without ever being passed
to mt76_wcid_init().
Since commit 0335c034e726 ("wifi: mt76: fix race condition related to
checking tx queue fill status"), mt76_tx() queues every such frame on the
WCID's tx_pending or tx_offchannel queue and links its tx_list. The first
injected frame therefore reaches __skb_queue_tail() with an uninitialized
sk_buff_head and dereferences a NULL prev pointer.
Initialize the WCID before publishing it.
The fix was tested on an MT7603 PCIe device. Three wildcard probe requests
were injected through a monitor interface. The hardware queue head and tail
advanced from 0 to 3 and a second radio captured the third request over the
air. No oops or reset occurred. After restoring AP mode, a 150 MB transfer
also completed without a reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: Handle cpu hotplug race in guarantee_active_cpus()
With commit 2125c0034c5d ("cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset hotplug processing
synchronous"), the cpuset hotplug operation becomes synchronous. That
commit also removes the code that handles race between cpuset_hotplug_work
and cpu hotplug notifier with the assumption that race is now gone.
Later commit 7a0aabd9ce69 ("cgroup/cpuset: Always use cpu_active_mask")
updates the cpuset code to always use cpu_active_mask instead of
cpu_online_mask in some places including guarantee_online_cpus() which
is renamed to guarantee_active_cpus() in that commit.
In the case of CPU offline operation, cpu_active_mask is updated
first in sched_cpu_deactivate() to remove the offline CPU before
cpuset_handle_hotplug() is called to update the effective_cpus of the
affected cpusets. The cpu_online_mask is updated after that near the end
of the offline operation to remove the offline CPU. As a result, the race
comes back and the top cpuset may not have any active CPU leading to NULL
pointer dereference during the race window when guarantee_active_cpus()
is called after cpu_active_mask is updated to remove the CPU to be torn
down but before cpuset_handle_hotplug() is able to properly update the
effective_cpus of the top cpuset.
Fix this by adding back the NULL cs check to avoid this problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: do not warn on route notification size race
Commit 680aea08e78c ("net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib hardware
flags are changed") added asynchronous route notifications for hardware
flag changes.
fib_alias_hw_flags_set() sizes the skb with fib_nlmsg_size() and later
fills it with fib_dump_info() while holding only RCU. With nexthop
compatibility mode enabled, a concurrent replacement can grow the group
between these independent snapshots. fib_dump_info() can then
legitimately return -EMSGSIZE, so the warning does not prove a sizing bug.
Remove the warning. The existing error path still frees the skb and
reports the error to listeners. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: stop exception dump when nexthop group shrinks
Commit 4ce5dc9316de ("inet: switch inet_dump_fib() to RCU
protection") allowed IPv4 FIB dumps to run concurrently with nexthop
replacement.
fib_dump_info_fnhe() uses fib_info_num_path() as the loop bound,
then fib_info_nhc() independently reloads nh->nh_grp. If
RTM_NEWNEXTHOP replaces a group with fewer paths between those loads,
fib_info_nhc() returns NULL and the dump dereferences it through
nhc_flags.
Stop the walk when the indexed path is absent. Nexthop groups are
dense, so the current snapshot has no later path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust_binder: reschedule node refcount update on thread exit
When a thread exits via BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, its pending work items are
cancelled. If a thread exits while holding a pending node refcount
increment (e.g. pushed as deferred work to that thread), the refcount
increment was previously dropped because Node::cancel() and
NodeWrapper::cancel() were no-ops.
Dropping the refcount update leaves the node's delivery state and count
state desynchronized, and userspace will not receive the notification,
which can cause the node to never be freed from the process's nodes tree
when all external references are dropped.
Fix this by implementing DeliverToRead::cancel() for Node and NodeWrapper
to move the pending refcount update to the process's work queue on thread
exit so another thread can deliver it to userspace. |
