| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() stores the new order and only then walks
the CPUs, returning -EBUSY if any of them has resizing disabled. A user
mapped buffer has resizing disabled, and __rb_map_vma() reads
buffer->subbuf_order without buffer->mutex, so an mmap of an already
mapped CPU racing the failing order change sizes the mapping with the
new order and inserts pages past the sub-buffer into the VMA.
Check the CPUs before storing the new order. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: release all action references on NEWACTION failure
When a batched RTM_NEWACTION request replaces an existing action,
tcf_idr_check_alloc() takes a temporary reference on it. If a later
action fails to initialize, tcf_action_destroy() uses strict release
semantics to clean up the actions initialized so far. For an action
bound to a filter, the strict check returns -EPERM without dropping
the temporary reference.
This error also makes tcf_action_destroy() return before releasing
subsequent entries. Any new action initialized between the bound
action and the failing entry is leaked together with its reserved
IDR slot, preventing reuse of its index.
Use tcf_idr_release() to drop each reference held by the batch without
rejecting bound actions. This allows cleanup to continue through all
initialized entries and preserves the module reference release when
an action is destroyed. Explicit action deletion and flushing retain
their separate bind-count checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: use option bits for CFM/MRP frame handlers
CFM and MRP register a global br_frame_type whose hlist_node is linked
into the per-bridge frame_type_list when the first MEP/MRP instance is
created. Enabling the protocol on multiple bridges therefore inserts the
same node into multiple lists. Unregistering it on one bridge then
corrupts list state belonging to another.
These handlers can only be installed once per bridge, and they are
uncommon. Track their per-bridge enable state with net_bridge option
bits, which already live on the Rx hot cache line, and dispatch the
matching handler directly from the receive path. Check both bits
together first as an unlikely case.
Remove the generic frame_type_list and br_frame_type helpers, which
have had no other users since CFM and MRP were added. That shrinks
struct net_bridge by 8 bytes and drops the list walk from the fast
path. When neither protocol is compiled in, BR_CFM_MRP_OPTS is 0 and
the compiler prunes the branch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: tag_brcm: legacy FCS: request needed tailroom
The legacy FCS tagger calculates the CRC over skb->len bytes starting at
skb->data. When a nonlinear skb reaches the tagger, this reads past the
linear head into unrelated slab memory.
The tagger appends an Ethernet FCS but does not declare that tailroom. As a
result, DSA leaves NETIF_F_SG and NETIF_F_FRAGLIST enabled on the user
port, and nonlinear skbs can reach the CRC calculation.
Declare the required tailroom. DSA will then clear those features and the
networking core will linearize skbs before the tagger runs.
A KASAN-enabled dsa_loop test using this tagger reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880397086c0 by task exp/135
Call Trace:
crc32_le (lib/crc/crc32-main.c:38)
brcm_leg_fcs_tag_xmit (net/dsa/tag_brcm.c:343)
dsa_user_xmit (net/dsa/user.c:942)
dev_hard_start_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3937)
__dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4926)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3110)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2281)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888039708400
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region [ffff888039708400, ffff8880397086c0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Reserve extra CQ slot for the fence completion CQE
The RX completion queue is sized to hold exactly one CQE per posted RX WQE.
MANA_FENCE_RQ makes hardware post an additional CQE_RX_OBJECT_FENCE after
the packet CQEs. The current sizing reserves no extra slot for it and in
rare cases, CQ has no guaranteed slot for the fence CQE when it is full of
packet CQEs. This can lead to dropping the fence completion while the
driver waits holding RTNL lock throughout the timeout duration.
Reserve one extra CQE slot for CQE_RX_OBJECT_FENCE. mana_gd_alloc_memory()
requires queue_size to be a power-of-two and at least MANA_PAGE_SIZE;
the reservation pushes cq_size past a power-of-two, so round up the CQ size
in mana_create_rxq(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped
skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb->inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.
Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key->eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:
skb->network_header = skb->inner_network_header;
so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:
if (skb_network_offset(skb) > MAX_L2_LEN)
a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:
unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
memcpy(&data->l2_data, skb->data, hlen);
which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.
Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450
Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b067f52 ("ipv6: sr: restore network
header before routing and forwarding"): a stale network header offset
reaching a consumer that widens it. Here it originates in the MPLS
push/pop path.
Clear inner_protocol once the packet is no longer MPLS, so a later push
re-records the current header. net/sched/act_mpls.c is the only other
skb_mpls_pop() caller and gets the same fix; sch_frag.c saves and
restores inner_protocol around fragmentation in the same way OVS does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix use-after-free of the flow table mask array
tbl_mask_array_realloc() retires the old mask_array before it stops being
reachable:
old = ovsl_dereference(tbl->mask_array);
if (old) {
...
call_rcu(&old->rcu, mask_array_rcu_cb);
}
rcu_assign_pointer(tbl->mask_array, new);
call_rcu() only waits for read-side critical sections already in flight.
tbl->mask_array still points at old between the call_rcu() and the
rcu_assign_pointer(), so a reader entering ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_stats() in
that window picks up old in a fresh critical section that the pending
grace period does not cover.
tbl_mask_array_realloc() runs in process context under ovs_mutex, so the
window is preemptible and can outlast the grace period. Then
mask_array_rcu_cb() frees old before the swap runs:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in flow_lookup.constprop.0+0x2bf/0x2f0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888020b3e018 by task poc/741
flow_lookup.constprop.0+0x2bf/0x2f0
ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_stats+0x4a3/0x5c0
ovs_dp_process_packet+0x19c/0x710
ovs_vport_receive+0x243/0x390
internal_dev_xmit+0x81/0x170
Freed by task 728:
kfree+0x16a/0x4e0
rcu_core+0x853/0x1030
Publish the new array before retiring the old one. The kfree_rcu() that
call_rcu() replaced ran after the swap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix uninitialized return value in netfs_unbuffered_write()
If preparation of the first subrequest fails,
netfs_unbuffered_write() exits its loop before ret is initialized. The
empty-iterator check can do the same.
For synchronous writes, netfs_unbuffered_write_iter_locked() may then
return an unrelated error instead of wreq->error. This is reachable
through CIFS if cifs_prepare_write() fails to reopen the file or obtain
credits.
Initialize ret to 0 so the caller returns wreq->error if no data was
written, or the number of bytes already written otherwise.
Found with Clang's -Wconditional-uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: cttimeout: prevent UAF during module unload
nf_ct_set_timeout() protects the timeout hook dereference and policy lookup
with rcu_read_lock(). cttimeout_exit(), however, unregisters the per-net
operations before it clears the hook.
This allows the following interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1
cttimeout_exit() nf_ct_set_timeout()
unregister_pernet_subsys() rcu_read_lock()
kfree(pernet) h = nf_ct_timeout_hook
h->timeout_find_get()
nfct_timeout_pernet()
The hook still points to ctnl_timeout_find_get() when CPU 1 looks up the
already freed per-net timeout list. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnl_timeout_find_get
Read of size 8 by task poc/90
Call Trace:
ctnl_timeout_find_get+0x271/0x2a0 [nfnetlink_cttimeout]
nf_ct_set_timeout+0x7b/0x3c0
xt_ct_tg_check+0x724/0xb20
xt_check_target+0x234/0xa90
do_ipt_set_ctl+0x570/0x1270
Allocated by task 89:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x16e/0x460
ops_init+0x6d/0x420
register_pernet_operations+0x2f6/0x670
Freed by task 91:
kfree+0x131/0x390
ops_undo_list+0x3d4/0x730
unregister_pernet_operations+0x232/0x490
unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
cttimeout_exit+0x52/0x970 [nfnetlink_cttimeout]
Clear the hook and wait for existing readers before unregistering the
per-net operations. This blocks new policy lookups and ensures readers that
observed the hook finish before the per-net storage is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_log: unregister loggers before per-net teardown
nf_log_syslog and nfnetlink_log unregister their per-network namespace
operations before unregistering their global logger backends. This
leaves a window where a sysctl or netlink writer can rebind the still-
registered logger after the per-net pre-exit callback cleared the old
selection.
The race looks like this:
CPU 0 CPU 1
---- ----
unregister_pernet_subsys()
nf_log_unset(net, logger)
net->nf.nf_loggers[pf] = NULL
lock nf_log_mutex
find logger in loggers[][]
net->nf.nf_loggers[pf] = logger
unlock nf_log_mutex
nf_log_unregister(logger)
lock nf_log_mutex
loggers[pf][type] = NULL
unlock nf_log_mutex
synchronize_rcu()
module exit returns
module core frees backend memory
Later, a sysctl read or packet logging operation can dereference the
stale per-net logger pointer.
Fix this by unregistering the global logger backends before tearing down
per-net state. Once the global registrations are gone, later writers can
no longer rebind the logger. unregister_pernet_subsys() already waits
for an RCU grace period after the pre-exit callback clears the per-net
selection, while nf_log_unregister() continues to cover readers of the
global logger table.
Apply this ordering fix to both nf_log backends that combine per-net
teardown with global logger registration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa: ifcvf: Put device on unsupported feature error
Route unsupported provisioned features through the common error path after
vdpa_alloc_device() so the allocated device and adapter pointer are
released consistently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: autofs: fix memory leak in autofs_fill_super()
In autofs_fill_super(), we create a new inode using
autofs_new_ino(), however, if we fail to create root_inode,
(that is, root_inode failure path), we return -ENOMEM without
freeing the new inode(ino) that we created causing a memory leak.
Fix this by adding autofs_free_ino() to free the inode we created
in root_inode failure path before returning ENOMEM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: preserve LZMA decoders on resize failure
The pool-resize path frees each stream's old decoder before allocating
its replacement. If an allocation fails after some streams have already
been replaced, the failed stream is put back on the list with state ==
NULL. z_erofs_lzma_max_dictsize is still advanced as if the whole
pool had been resized.
An existing LZMA mount can select the broken stream and pass
NULL to xz_dec_microlzma_reset(). A retry at the same size also
skip another resize attempt. Since the global maximum was advanced,
thus, the invalid state is left unrepaired.
Allocate each replacement before freeing the old decoder, temporarily
retaining one old decoder during allocation. Stop at the first failure
and advance z_erofs_lzma_max_dictsize only after all streams satisfy
the request.
Record each stream's dictionary capacity so retries can skip streams
already enlarged before a partial failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: vfb: defer cleanup until the last reference
FBIOGETCMAP takes a shallow snapshot of info->cmap and performs the
usercopy after dropping info->lock. vfb_remove() frees the colormap
immediately after unregistering the framebuffer, even when an open file
still holds a reference to fb_info. A concurrent driver unbind can
therefore free the colormap while the ioctl copies it to userspace.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user
Read of size 512 by task poc/125
_copy_to_user (./include/linux/instrumented.h:129 ./include/linux/uaccess.h:201 lib/usercopy.c:24)
fb_cmap_to_user (./include/linux/uaccess.h:230 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcmap.c:211)
do_fb_ioctl (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_chrdev.c:114)
Allocated by task 1:
fb_alloc_cmap_gfp (./include/linux/slab.h:973 ./include/linux/slab.h:1290 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcmap.c:108)
vfb_probe (drivers/video/fbdev/vfb.c:459)
Freed by task 124:
fb_dealloc_cmap (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcmap.c:151)
vfb_remove (drivers/video/fbdev/vfb.c:489)
unregister_framebuffer() drops the registration reference, and fbdev calls
fb_destroy after the last put_fb_info(). Move the registered framebuffer's
cleanup into an fb_destroy callback so its colormap and screen buffer stay
alive until all file references have been released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: disable DIM work before freeing q_vectors
idpf never drains the Tx/Rx DIM works before freeing the memory they
live in. tx_dim and rx_dim are embedded in struct idpf_q_vector, they
are queued from the NAPI poll via net_dim(), and idpf_vport_intr_rel()
ends with kfree(rsrc->q_vectors). Nothing in the driver cancels them.
idpf_tx_dim_work() and idpf_rx_dim_work() then run on freed memory:
idpf_vport_intr_write_itr() writes the ITR register through
q_vector->intr_reg.tx_itr / rx_itr, void __iomem pointers loaded out of
the freed q_vector. No configuration is needed to get there --
IDPF_ITR_IS_DYNAMIC() is defined as (itr_mode) and idpf_vport_alloc()
initialises both modes to IDPF_ITR_DYNAMIC.
Draining after idpf_vport_intr_napi_dis_all() is not enough on its own.
idpf_net_dim() is called from inside the
"if (napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))" branch of the poll, and
napi_complete_done() has already cleared NAPIF_STATE_SCHED by then.
napi_disable_locked() waits only while (val & (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED |
NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)), so napi_disable() can return while the poll tail is
still queueing the work, and a plain cancel_work_sync() would be
re-armed behind the drain.
Use disable_work_sync(): schedule_work() on a work with a non-zero
disable count is dropped by clear_pending_if_disabled() before
__queue_work() is reached.
Move idpf_init_dim() to idpf_vport_intr_alloc() so the works are
initialised on every path that can reach the drain -- the three
"goto intr_deinit" sites between idpf_vport_intr_init() and
idpf_vport_intr_ena() get there without the enable side having run.
Nothing re-enables them: rsrc->q_vectors is freed on every exit from
idpf_vport_open() and on every idpf_vport_stop(), so the count dies with
the object.
It is a race, not a deterministic failure -- net_dim() only schedules
once DIM_NEVENTS events have accumulated and the profile index changes.
A KASAN ifup/ifdown loop under load is the way to see it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: frags: invalidate queues before flushing them
fqdir_pre_exit() flushes the skbs from incomplete queues without
changing their completion state. A fragment which found a queue before
high_thresh was cleared can then acquire the queue lock and reuse stale
reassembly metadata. A queue concurrently killed after fqdir->dead is
set can instead become INET_FRAG_COMPLETE|INET_FRAG_HASH_DEAD while
still holding its old skbs; skipping it because it is complete leaves
those references behind until asynchronous fqdir teardown.
For IPv6, stale metadata can make ip6_frag_reasm() use the old
nhoffset with a new skb and access memory out of bounds. The resulting
heap corruption can be leveraged for local privilege escalation when
unprivileged network namespaces are available. Unflushed fragments can
also keep conntrack references alive after the conntrack per-net
cleanup point.
Kill each incomplete queue, then flush every queue still owned by the
dying rhashtable. HASH_DEAD identifies that ownership, while complete
queues without it are already owned by another destroy path and must be
left alone. Releasing a timer reference removed by inet_frag_kill() is
deferred to inet_frag_putn(), after the queue lock is dropped.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipv6_frag_rcv (net/ipv6/reassembly.c:289 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:229 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:391 (discriminator 2))
Write of size 1 at addr ff110001039c6e00 by task poc/771
Call Trace:
? ipv6_frag_rcv (net/ipv6/reassembly.c:289 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:229 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:391 (discriminator 2))
ipv6_frag_rcv (net/ipv6/reassembly.c:289 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:229 (discriminator 2) net/ipv6/reassembly.c:391 (discriminator 2))
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:479 (discriminator 5))
ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534)
ipv6_rcv (include/net/dst.h:480 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:119 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:109 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:325 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:319 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351 (discriminator 3))
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3110 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142)
__x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2883 net/socket.c:2880 net/socket.c:2880)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ff110001039c6b40
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region [ff110001039c6b40, ff110001039c6e00)
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:423 (discriminator 1))
Read of size 1 at addr ff110001039c6e08 by task poc/771
Call Trace:
? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:423 (discriminator 1))
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:423 (discriminator 1))
ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534)
ipv6_rcv (include/net/dst.h:480 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:119 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:109 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:325 (discriminator 3) include/linux/netfilter.h:319 (discriminator 3) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351 (discriminator 3))
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3110 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142)
__x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2883 net/socket.c:2880 net/socket.c:2880)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:2959 net/packet/af_packet.c:3053 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142)
__x64_sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2883 net/socket.c:2880 net/socket.c:2880)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ff110001039c6b40
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
The buggy address is located 8 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region [ff110001039c6b40, ff110001039c6e00) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: 6lowpan: fix NULL dereference in lowpan_newlink
TUNSETLINK allows a TUN device to change its link-layer type to
ARPHRD_IEEE802154 without initializing ieee802154_ptr. lowpan_newlink()
checks only the device type before dereferencing the pointer, so an
RTM_NEWLINK request can trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
Reject devices without ieee802154_ptr along with devices of the wrong type. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: cc2520: fix FIFOP work use-after-free
The FIFOP interrupt handler queues cc2520_fifop_irqwork. On removal,
cc2520_remove() only flushes the work. The devm-managed FIFOP IRQ
remains active until after ->remove() returns and can queue the work
again after that flush, allowing it to run after the private data is
released.
Disable the work with disable_work_sync() instead of flushing it, so
the handler can no longer queue it once removal begins. Destroy the
buffer mutex last, since the worker and the stop callback invoked
through ieee802154_unregister_hw() both take it.
Found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: hwsim: serialize pib updates to fix double-free
hwsim_update_pib() does an unserialized read-swap-free of phy->pib:
pib_old = rtnl_dereference(phy->pib);
...
rcu_assign_pointer(phy->pib, pib);
kfree_rcu(pib_old, rcu);
It assumes the RTNL is held, but ->set_channel is not always called
under it: the mac802154 scan worker changes channels via
drv_set_channel() without the RTNL. Such an update can race an
RTNL-held one on the same phy; both read the same pib_old and both
kfree_rcu() it, double-freeing the object. With SLUB percpu sheaves
batching kfree_rcu(), this surfaces as a KASAN invalid-free in
rcu_free_sheaf().
struct hwsim_phy has no lock for pib. Add one and make the swap atomic
with rcu_replace_pointer() under it, dropping the misleading
rtnl_dereference(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: fib: bound automatic table ID allocation
fib_empty_table() probes every table ID from 1 until it finds a
free one. IPv4 tables are stored in a 256-bucket hash table, so a
dense set of IDs makes each probe walk a growing hash chain while
RTNL is held.
Automatic table assignment ("ip rule ... table 0") is an IPv4-only
legacy path. Bound the automatically allocated ID to 4096 so the
RTNL hold stays bounded, without changing lookups of explicitly
specified table IDs.
This changes user-visible behavior. A table-0 rule previously
received the lowest free ID in 1..RT_TABLE_MAX (0xFFFFFFFF). After
this patch the search stops at 4096 and the rule add fails with
ENOBUFS if that range is fully occupied. Explicit table IDs above
4096 remain usable.
The automatic path is unused in practice: it is IPv4-only, not
documented by ip-rule, uncovered by kernel selftests, and both
NetworkManager and systemd refuse table 0. |