| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't get the radio mask for netdev-less wdevs
cfg80211_calculate_bi_data() calls rdev_get_radio_mask() with
wdev->netdev, which can be NULL and then crashes in mac80211.
To avoid that, invert the order of checks since wdev->netdev
is always valid for beaconing interfaces. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: check IP header size in cfg80211_classify8021d()
A frame that looks like IP can be transmitted, but be too short, so
the DS field is read incorrectly:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
ieee80211_select_queue+0x37a/0x9e0 net/mac80211/wme.c:180
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60f/0x1d90 net/mac80211/tx.c:4304
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xa8/0x6d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:4538
...
packet_sendmsg+0x9173/0xa2a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
Use skb_header_pointer() like the MPLS case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: Fix device kref underflow in dma_chan_put()
dma_chan_get() takes chan->device->ref only on the slow path:
/* no kref on fast path */
if (chan->client_count) {
__module_get(owner);
chan->client_count++;
return 0;
}
if (!try_module_get(owner))
return -ENODEV;
if (!dma_device_get(chan->device)) { // calls kref_get_unless_zero()
dma_chan_put() drops the ref unconditionally, so every fast-path
get/put pair drops one extra device reference.
The bug fires when two conditions hold together: a non-private
provider has a persistent client holding chan->client_count > 0
and another client cycles dmaengine_get()/dmaengine_put().
When the kref hits zero, the subsequent dma_find_channel() returns
NULL even though the provider module is still loaded.
Fix this by dropping device->ref only on the last put, matching the
single slow-path get. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()
When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref,
dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its
channels.
dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via
dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it:
slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0
Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319
Freed by task 6319:
kfree+0x225/0x470
dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0
dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160
Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing
module_put() does not need chan->device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: wait for RCU readers before releasing dma_device
dma_issue_pending_all() walks the dma_device_list with
list_for_each_entry_rcu() under rcu_read_lock(). dma_device_release()
unlinks the device with list_del_rcu() and then calls
device->device_release() (which in many drivers, such as plx_dma.c,
directly calls kfree()).
Because there is no grace period between unlinking the device and
freeing it, concurrent RCU readers in dma_issue_pending_all() can
access the device after it has been freed.
The lockless walk originally relied on clients holding a dmaengine
reference to pin the provider module, and therefore the device, for as
long as they might traverse the list. Commit 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine:
Add reference counting to dma_device struct") decoupled the dma_device
lifetime from the module reference, so the device can now be released
while a reader is still walking the list.
Add synchronize_rcu() before the device is freed, so RCU readers are
guaranteed to have finished. Keep it unconditional: providers that do
not implement device_release() free the device themselves once
dma_async_device_unregister() returns. This call will delay for a grace
period with dma_list_mutex held, which is safe and only teardown path is
delayed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't free driver-owned scan requests
When an interface goes down while a scan is running, cfg80211 completes
the scan towards userspace and frees the scan request. However, the
driver can be convinced that it owns the request, since the cancellation
is (intended to be) asynchronous.
The WARN_ON() in the netdev notifier was meant to catch this, but it's
not actually avoidable, so it triggers and we get a UAF in scan_done().
There doesn't seem to be a great way around it, so just track that the
driver is still convinced it owns the request, and then just free it on
completion if it was already cancelled. Also remove the warnings since
they can trigger in the intended architecture. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: only group hidden BSSes with beacon entries
When a probe response for an unknown BSS comes in, __cfg80211_bss_update()
looks for an existing entry with the same BSSID and a hidden (zero-length
or NUL-filled) SSID, and if it finds one it groups them, using the beacon
IEs from the existing entry.
But that could find another entry without a beacon, if it was also from a
probe response (with SSID), so there's a group without beacon elements.
If a beacon with a hidden SSID for that BSSID arrives later,
cfg80211_combine_bsses() goes looking for the probe response entries that
belong to it - i.e. entries with the same BSSID and channel that have no
beacon IEs - and finds those two. They are already grouped with each
other, so it hits its
WARN_ON_ONCE(bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&bss->hidden_list))
which are there because an entry without beacon elements is not supposed
to be part of a group yet.
Only combine entries when a beacon was already received, ones that are
kept separate will be combined when a beacon arrives. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: don't filter by BSS type when removing stale entries
When an assoc AP switches to a channel that already has a BSS entry,
cfg80211_update_assoc_bss_entry() removes that entry before rehashing
the real one, since the two would otherwise collide in the BSS rbtree.
The lookup for that entry also required it to match the connection's BSS
type, so an entry advertising e.g. the IBSS capability bit was left in
place, and the following cfg80211_rehash_bss() then ran into it:
WARN_ON(!cmp)
Changing the type shouldn't really happen, but can be triggered by a
rogue AP/device, so drop the check and remove any entries matching
the comparison. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: ibss: ref BSS entry for joined event
When the IBSS is joined, we only record the BSSID/channel in the event
and look up the BSS entry when processing it. However, that's racy,
e.g. a new scan with NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_FLUSH can remove it, causing a
warning in the event work:
!bss
WARNING: net/wireless/ibss.c:37 at __cfg80211_ibss_joined+0x3d3/0x440
Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_event_work
cfg80211_process_wdev_events+0x39f/0x5b0 net/wireless/util.c:1144
cfg80211_process_rdev_events+0xa1/0x110 net/wireless/util.c:1179
cfg80211_event_work+0x2f/0x40 net/wireless/core.c:393
Do the lookup early (the driver is expected to only join an IBSS that
has a BSS entry) and keep a reference to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't start a ROC while scanning
The ROC work can be pending when a scan starts (which requires
ROC list to be empty, but that's possible), and then a new ROC
can be added to the list and the work will pick it up.
Avoid starting that ROC if a scan made it between things, as
otherwise we'll hit a warning later:
WARNING: net/mac80211/offchannel.c:404 at ieee80211_start_next_roc+0x256/0x2d0
Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work
Call Trace:
__ieee80211_scan_completed+0x4fd/0xe40 net/mac80211/scan.c:537
ieee80211_scan_work+0x472/0x1ff0 net/mac80211/scan.c:1193
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x410/0x570 net/wireless/core.c:513 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't offload TC setup on AP_VLAN interfaces
AP_VLAN interfaces are purely virtual, so don't try to offload
TC setup to drivers. We can't really use the AP interface either
since we may not know it all the time, and it could technically
even change.
Just reject the TC offload so things get done in software. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: abort chanswitch when leaving a mesh
The code in ieee80211_stop_mesh() leaves CSA active, but leaving
the mesh released the channel context, so the CSA finalize work
crashes:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000003
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_put_srates_elem+0x42/0x640 net/mac80211/util.c:3272
Call Trace:
ieee80211_mesh_build_beacon+0xa83/0x1b50 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1093
ieee80211_mesh_rebuild_beacon+0xc7/0x170 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1147
ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa+0x131/0x210 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1542
ieee80211_set_after_csa_beacon net/mac80211/cfg.c:4085 [inline]
__ieee80211_csa_finalize net/mac80211/cfg.c:4133 [inline]
ieee80211_csa_finalize+0x633/0x1150 net/mac80211/cfg.c:4155
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2ab/0x450 net/wireless/core.c:438
Abort the channel switch properly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reset state when starting AP fails
ieee80211_start_ap() can set enable_beacon (and beacon_int) and fail
later, leaving it set forever. Scanning can then attempt to restore
beaconing on such an interface, leading to:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:mac80211_hwsim_link_info_changed+0xca7/0xf00
Call Trace:
drv_link_info_changed+0x413/0x860 net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:495
ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0x24b/0x3c0 net/mac80211/main.c:427
ieee80211_offchannel_return+0x381/0x580 net/mac80211/offchannel.c:160
__ieee80211_scan_completed+0x993/0xe30 net/mac80211/scan.c:519
ieee80211_scan_work+0x472/0x2010 net/mac80211/scan.c:1193
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2b7/0x550 net/wireless/core.c:538
in hwsim. Also, cfg80211 then allows changing the interface type,
and the off-channel path getgs confused about beaconing as well,
leading to another warning:
WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:468 at drv_link_info_changed+0x583/0x880
ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0x24b/0x3c0 net/mac80211/main.c:427
ieee80211_offchannel_stop_vifs+0x328/0x5c0 net/mac80211/offchannel.c:122
ieee80211_start_sw_scan net/mac80211/scan.c:583 [inline]
__ieee80211_start_scan+0xfb6/0x1af0 net/mac80211/scan.c:882
Reset the state on failures to always have it correct. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reset the LED state when ifup fails
When the first interface comes up, the radio LED is turned on. This can
start the TPT trigger timer, which continues running.
But if bringing up the interface fails then the timer keeps running and
won't be stopped by anything, eventually it can be freed:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff888127e12130 object type: timer_list hint: tpt_trig_timer+0x0/0x300 net/mac80211/led.c:145
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5923 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1a2/0x2b0
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x4b7/0x600 lib/debugobjects.c:1129
kfree+0x436/0x670 mm/slub.c:6818
ieee80211_led_exit+0x162/0x1c0 net/mac80211/led.c:210
ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x27e/0x3a0 net/mac80211/main.c:1706
rt2x00lib_remove_dev+0x55b/0x670
Undo the LED state in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: only operate on TDLS peers in the TDLS code
ieee80211_tdls_oper() can operate on the AP station, which then
yields various warnings when the AP station is removed then or
at a later point in time after being confused for a TDLS peer.
Always check that the station is a TDLS peer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: unlist vifs when their netdev is unregistered
mac80211 only removes vifs from the local->interfaces list when
an interface is removed via ieee80211_if_remove(), before it
unregisters the netdev. However, it's possible for a netdev to
be unregistered without going through that: When the netns that
holds the wiphy is destroyed, the wiphy is supposed to move to
the init_ns, but that can run into allocation failures.
Then, mac80211 has an interface listed that doesn't exist, and
will eventually hit
BUG: failure at net/wireless/core.h:141/wiphy_to_rdev()!
...
_cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x24/0x36a [cfg80211]
cfg80211_unregister_wdev+0x15/0x1d [cfg80211]
ieee80211_remove_interfaces+0x1ff/0x257 [mac80211]
ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x73/0x1d1 [mac80211]
mac80211_hwsim_del_radio+0x114/0x166 [mac80211_hwsim]
Remove the interface from the list in ->ndo_uninit if it's still
around to avoid this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: get the wiphy out of a dying network namespace
When a network namespace is destroyed, cfg80211_pernet_exit() moves any
wiphy back to the initial namespace, and just warns if that fails. But
moving an interface can fail (due to allocation failures), and then the
wiphy is left behind with a garbage netns pointer:
Kernel mode fault at addr 0x30
genlmsg_multicast_netns.constprop.0+0x46/0xcf [cfg80211]
nl80211_notify_wiphy+0xcd/0xe8 [cfg80211]
wiphy_unregister+0x169/0x3fc [cfg80211]
Note that commit debac3a20dec ("net: Remove conflicting altnames for
dying netns in __dev_change_net_namespace().") fixed another path
that could reach it without allocation failures.
Remove interfaces that cannot be moved instead of failing the switch,
so that the wiphy always ends up in the initial namespace. In this
case the netdev core will unregister the interfaces anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't allow injecting frames wider than the chanctx
Frames injected on a monitor interface can carry a radiotap
field requesting a bandwidth, which mac80211 passes down to
the driver regardless of the the actual operational bandwidth.
If the bandwidth requested is too wide, that triggers a warning
in hwsim:
WARN_ON(hwsim_get_chanwidth(bw) > hwsim_get_chanwidth(confbw))
Drop such frames entirely instead since they cannot be sent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: add HE 6 GHz capability in the scan elems len
The HE 6 GHz Band Capability element is in the probe request for
every band if 6 GHz is supported, so add the size to scan_ies_len.
Otherwise, building probe request elements can fail, triggering the
WARN_ON in __ieee80211_start_scan(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: mesh: reset the CSA state when leaving
ifmsh->csa is allocated in ieee80211_mesh_csa_beacon() and only freed
in ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa(), i.e. when the channel switch completes.
Leaving the mesh while a switch is still pending therefore leaks it.
Additionally, ifmsh->csa_role and ifmsh->chsw_ttl have their state leak
in this case, so things can get mixed up in addition to the memory
leak.
Refactor the reset and call it in ieee80211_stop_mesh() to fix it all. |
