| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Smart Post WordPress plugin before 4.0.8 does not check whether a post is password protected before returning its content and its stored password through an unauthenticated AJAX action, allowing unauthenticated users to read protected post content and the password that guards it. |
| The Eventin WordPress plugin before 4.1.21 does not properly validate a template path value before using it to include a local file, allowing users with contributor-level access and above to include and execute arbitrary local PHP files. |
| Jenkins Job Configuration History Plugin 1367.vc8fa_b_15101dc and earlier allows overwriting the plugin's history recording configuration through Stapler data binding, allowing attackers to redirect history storage to an attacker-specified directory and modify history recording settings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Add missing access_ok call to copy_user_syms
As reported by sashiko we use __get_user without prior access_ok call on the
user space pointer. Adding the missing call for the whole pointer array.
Plus removing the err check in the error path, because it's not needed and
also we can return -ENOMEM directly from the first kvmalloc_array fail path.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260611115503.AC16D1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: microread: validate target discovery payload lengths
microread_target_discovered() parses target discovery payloads from
skb->data according to the HCI gate. The fixed field offsets and UID
copies were checked only against the destination nfc_target buffers, not
against the actual skb length.
Validate that each gate-specific payload contains the fixed fields and
UID bytes before reading or copying them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl
Syzbot reported list corruption caused by a double list_add_tail() call on
bh->b_assoc_buffers within nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers().
Analysis revealed that the root cause was the insertion of a page/folio
with a page index of ULONG_MAX into the page cache via the GC ioctl.
filemap_get_folios_tag(), called by nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(),
repeatedly detects a dirty folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX due to
index wrap-around, leading to duplicate processing of dirty buffers.
As a preparatory step, the GC ioctl loads the page/folio of the block to
be moved during GC and inserts it into the page cache based on information
in the nilfs_vdesc structure passed as an argument. Normally, this does
not cause issues because the user-space GC library configures the
nilfs_vdesc structure properly. However, since there is no range check on
the parameters determining the page index, a request with artificially
crafted parameters -- such as those generated by Syzbot -- can result in a
page/folio being inserted with a page index of ULONG_MAX, triggering the
above problem.
This resolves the issue by checking the ranges of 'vd_offset' and
'vd_vblocknr' in the nilfs_vdesc structure that determine the page index,
thereby preventing the invalid page/folio insertions. |
| Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5. |
| Apache Allura: exposure of non-public information via search.
This issue affects Apache Allura: through 1.20.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.21.0, which fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb
Commit 27256cdb290e ("nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and
add length checks") fixed the unbounded TLV walk in nfc_llcp_recv_snl(),
and commit d8bd2dedbde5 ("nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in
TLV parsers") subsequently bounded nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and
nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(). One sibling parser sharing the same
pattern remains unbounded: nfc_llcp_connect_sn().
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() walks a TLV list, reading a two-byte header
(type, length) followed by length bytes of value, without checking that
the two header bytes or the declared length stay within the buffer. It
returns a pointer to a service name of up to 255 bytes that may point
past the end of the skb; it is subsequently consumed by memcmp() in
nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). In addition tlv_array_len was computed as
"skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE" in size_t, so a CONNECT/CC frame shorter
than the LLCP header underflows to a huge length and the walk runs far
past the buffer.
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() is reachable from nfc_llcp_recv_connect() and
nfc_llcp_recv_cc(), i.e. from received CONNECT and CC PDUs. A nearby
NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation
happens automatically after NFC-DEP, and the nfc_llcp_rx_skb()
dispatcher applies no minimum-length guard.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer(skb), and
validate each declared length before use, matching the approach already
used for nfc_llcp_recv_snl(). Starting the walk at
&skb->data[LLCP_HEADER_SIZE] against the tail pointer also removes the
size_t underflow for short frames.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| undici's dump interceptor reads and discards a response body up to a configurable maximum size. When a response declares a Content-Length that exceeds the maximum, the interceptor aborts cleanly, but when a response has no Content-Length and is chunked, the interceptor instead signals completion early once the accumulated size reaches the maximum, without pausing or aborting the request. Because the underlying parser keeps delivering body bytes, a second completion signal fires and trips an internal assertion, which aborts the request and tears down the connection. The application is left observing a misleading successful status with an empty or truncated body while the connection has actually been disconnected. This affects undici versions from 7.1.0 up to 7.29.1 and from 8.0.0 up to 8.10.2. Users should upgrade to undici 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. |
| undici's cache interceptor does not handle the Set-Cookie response header anywhere in its cache path, so it neither refuses to store nor strips that header. In shared cache mode, which is the default, an otherwise cacheable response that carries a Set-Cookie header, for example one marked with a public and max-age directive, is stored and then re-served to a later caller that matches the same cache key. As a result one caller's cookie is disclosed to a different caller, and an untrusted server can inject cookies into cached responses served to all subsequent callers. This violates the requirement that a shared cache must not store cookies. This affects undici versions from 7.0.0 up to 7.29.1 and from 8.0.0 up to 8.10.2. Users should upgrade to undici 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix vllist leak
Fix a leak of the new vllist in afs_update_cell() in the event that it is an
empty list (nr_servers == 0), in which case the old list isn't displaced
unless the old list is also empty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix the checksum validations
ip_vs_in_icmp_v6() is missing checksum validation for ICMPv6
packets from clients. In fact, as for TCP/UDP we should
validate the checksum for ICMP packets only when we
mangle the packets on MASQ or on reply for tunnel.
Also, Sashiko points out that handle_response_icmp() being
common for IPv4 and IPv6 is missing the pseudo-header
calculation while validating ICMPv6 messages from real
servers which is a problem if checksum is not validated
by the hardware.
Fix the problems by creating ip_vs_checksum_common_check()
helper and use it for TCP/UDP/ICMP both for IPv4 and IPv6.
Rely on the nf_checksum() for validating the ICMP messages
but use it also for TCP and UDP.
Use correct IP offset for IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT for TCP/UDP/SCTP.
IPVS packets (TCP/UDP/SCTP/ICMP) do not need checksum
validation on LOCAL_OUT (local clients or local real
servers) and on FORWARD (traffic from servers on LAN).
Do it only on LOCAL_IN, in case nf_checksum() is not
called on PRE_ROUTING.
Also, ip_vs_checksum_complete() can be marked static. |
| A lower privileged user who holds only the privilege to read agent policies can read the entire configuration of a configured Fleet proxy. This would normally require the Fleet privilege to read settings.The proxy configuration possibly contains proxy authentication credentials and private key material that they should not be authorized to view. |
| fastify versions before 5.12.2 decide whether to compile a request schema based on JavaScript truthiness, but JSON Schema Draft 7 defines the boolean false as a valid schema that rejects every instance. When an application assigns false to a route's body, querystring, params, or headers schema to deny all input, fastify treats it as a missing schema, compiles no validator, and runs the route handler on any request. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore reach a handler that a valid deny-all schema was intended to make unreachable, a complete validation bypass that can lead to unauthorized state changes or execution of disabled operations. Users should upgrade to fastify 5.12.2 or later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount()
The $MFT attribute-list walk in ntfs_read_inode_mount() validates each
entry only with "(u8 *)al_entry + 6 > al_end" and
"(u8 *)al_entry + le16_to_cpu(al_entry->length) > al_end", but then reads
al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and al_entry->mft_reference
(offset 16) -- fields beyond the 6 bytes proven in range. al_entry->length
is attacker-controlled and only required non-zero, so a short entry (e.g.
length 8) placed at the tail passes both checks while the lowest_vcn /
mft_reference reads fall past al_end.
al_end is ni->attr_list + attr_list_size (the on-disk size); the buffer is
kvzalloc(round_up(attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE)), so the sector rounding
usually absorbs the over-read -- but when attr_list_size is a multiple of
SECTOR_SIZE there is no slack and a crafted $MFT attribute list produces an
out-of-bounds read at mount time.
Validate the entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added in patch
1/3) before dereferencing it, matching the bound the other attribute-list
walks now use. The validator already requires the length to cover the fixed
header, which makes the separate "!al_entry->length" check redundant, so
drop it too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Validate CRIU-restored IDs before idr_alloc
The KFD CRIU restore flow restores previously saved object IDs from
userspace.
For event restore:
kfd_criu_restore_event()
-> create_signal_event() / create_other_event()
-> allocate_event_notification_slot()
-> idr_alloc(..., *restore_id, *restore_id + 1, ...)
For BO restore:
criu_restore_memory_of_gpu()
-> idr_alloc(..., bo_priv->idr_handle, ...)
In both cases, the restored ID comes from userspace-provided CRIU data.
idr_alloc() expects the ID range values to fit within signed int
limits. If a restored ID is larger than INT_MAX, it can trigger a WARN
in the IDR layer.
A kernel WARN is undesirable because it prints a warning trace and may
cause a panic or reboot on systems with panic_on_warn enabled.
Smatch reported these paths as allowing unchecked userspace values to
reach idr_alloc().
Add INT_MAX validation before using restored IDs in:
- kfd_criu_restore_event()
- criu_restore_memory_of_gpu()
If the restored ID is invalid, return -EINVAL.
This prevents invalid restore data from reaching the IDR layer and
avoids WARN-triggering paths, while keeping valid restore behavior
unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntb: Store original DMA address for future release
The DMA API requires that dma_free_attrs receive the exact dma_handle
originally returned by the allocation function. Do not modify it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: virtio - bound the akcipher result length
virtio_crypto_dataq_akcipher_callback() sets the result length from the
device-reported response length without bounding it to the destination
buffer, which was allocated for the original request length.
sg_copy_from_buffer() then reads that many bytes from the destination
buffer; a backend reporting a larger length over-reads adjacent kernel
heap into the caller's scatterlist (an out-of-bounds read).
Clamp the reported length to the originally requested destination length.
A conforming device reports no more than that, so valid results are
unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the
ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than
the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field.
That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with
hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary
segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves
its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to
memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access.
Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or
performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header
errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths. |
