| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly enforce the viewKeys authorization gate in CSV export and API index endpoints, allowing authenticated users with only licenses.view permission to access product keys. Attackers can download all license keys in bulk via CSV export or validate candidate keys through API response discrepancies without needing the viewKeys permission. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to sanitize the category EULA text field before rendering it in checkout confirmation emails. Attackers with low-privilege permissions can inject markdown image syntax or raw HTML img tags pointing to local files or remote URLs, which the mail auto-embed library resolves server-side and returns as email attachments, exfiltrating sensitive files like .env credentials and enabling SSRF attacks. |
| Snipe-IT through 8.6.4 (fixed in 8.7.0) does not enforce the components.view permission on the authenticated endpoint GET /api/v1/hardware/<asset-id>/assigned/components. The endpoint authorizes only assets.view on the parent asset before returning linked component details; the components.view check is applied only to the response's available_actions.view flag and not to the returned data. As a result, an authenticated user holding only assets.view can enumerate component IDs, names, assigned quantities, and notes that are otherwise protected — the direct GET /api/v1/components/<id> endpoint correctly returns 403 Forbidden for such users. |
| Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance->accept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the 'accepted' action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0. |
| Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to check the return value of Storage::delete() in UploadedFilesController::destroy() and Api\\UploadedFilesController::destroy(), allowing deletion requests to report success while files remain on disk. Administrators performing attachment deletions receive success responses and see files hidden from listings, but the physical files persist on disk and remain accessible to anyone with filesystem or backup access. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset management application. In Snipe-IT master-branch builds after 8.6.3 (the code was never included in a tagged release), SettingsController::downloadLocationScopingReport streams the FMCS location-scoping mismatch report (GET /admin/settings/location-scoping-report.csv) through a bare fputcsv() call without applying League\Csv\EscapeFormula, unlike the other CSV exports which honor config('app.escape_formulas'). An authenticated user with ordinary create/edit rights can place a spreadsheet formula in free-text fields that appear in the report (item name, asset tag, serial, item or location company name, location name) and arrange for the record to be FMCS-mismatched so it is included in the export. When a superuser downloads the report and opens it in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets with formula evaluation enabled and external-content warnings dismissed or disabled, cells beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR are executed in the victim's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on Windows Excel, legacy DDE command execution. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0. |
| snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to validate the requestable flag for asset models in the POST /account/request/asset_model/{modelId} endpoint. Authenticated users can bypass administrative restrictions and create checkout requests for non-requestable asset models by submitting requests directly to the endpoint. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to authorize the POST /hardware/history endpoint, allowing any authenticated user to reassign arbitrary assets and modify audit logs. Attackers can submit a CSV file to reassign assets across companies and inject fraudulent audit trail entries, compromising inventory integrity and accountability. |
| Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 does not apply the CheckUserIsActivated middleware to the `api` middleware group in app/Http/Kernel.php, and deactivating a user does not revoke that user's Passport personal access tokens. As a result, although a deactivated account is correctly refused at web login, its existing API token continues to authenticate and to grant read and write access to the REST API (assets, users, licenses, etc.) at the account's prior permission level until the token expires. A deactivated account that retains user-management permissions can re-activate itself through the API, permanently defeating the deactivation control. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 wipe the database before validating the uploaded backup archive in the restore endpoint. Superusers uploading corrupted or invalid zip files trigger permanent data loss with no recovery path or rollback mechanism. |
| Snipe-IT's predefined kit checkout path does not enforce Full Multiple Company Support (FMCS) tenant isolation on the checkout target. Unlike the single, bulk, API, accessory, license and consumable checkout paths, App\Services\PredefinedKitCheckoutService never calls $item->canCheckoutTo($target); it only performs the actor-vs-item policy check and an availability check before persisting the checkout. With FMCS enabled, a non-superuser who belongs to at least two companies and holds the assets.checkout permission can POST to /kits/{kit}/checkout with a user_id belonging only to company B and have a company-A asset (and likewise kit licenses, consumables and accessories) assigned to that user, bypassing the company-mismatch check that blocks the same operation on every other checkout path. The issue is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.2; it was runtime-verified on v8.6.3 and code-inspected on v8.7.1, and the affected service has lacked the check since 2019, so earlier FMCS deployments are likely also affected. |
| Snipe-IT 8.5.0 through 8.6.3 contains an open redirect vulnerability in its SAML assertion-consumer endpoint (SamlController::acs, POST /saml/acs). The endpoint wrote the RelayState POST parameter directly into Laravel's url.intended session key with only CR/LF characters stripped, and LoginController later issued redirect()->intended(), which passes an absolute URL through to the Location header unchanged. An unauthenticated attacker who induces a user of a SAML-SSO-enabled instance to visit a crafted IdP-initiated SSO link can therefore cause the victim's browser to be redirected to an arbitrary absolute external URL immediately after a successful authentication, which the advisory notes facilitates credential-harvesting phishing. No account on the target instance and no compromise of the identity provider are required. Only deployments with SAML SSO enabled are affected. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit d30b73d, PR #19386), which validates RelayState via a new Helper::sameOriginUrl check before storing it. |
| snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce per-instance FMCS scoping in asset audit endpoints, relying solely on query-layer filtering instead of policy-layer authorization checks. Attackers with valid sessions and assets.audit permissions could write audit log entries against cross-company assets if the query-layer scope were bypassed or refactored. |
| snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in location print endpoints that fails to enforce per-model authorization checks. Authenticated attackers with location view permission can access printassigned and printallassigned endpoints to retrieve related users, assets, accessories, consumables, and components regardless of their individual model permissions. |
| Snipe-IT versions >= 7.0.12 and <= 8.6.3 contain an authorization bypass in the Livewire importer component (App\Livewire\Importer, mounted at the imports.index route). The component only checked the broad 'import' ability at mount time, while its files() and activeFile() computed properties queried the imports table with no owner or company scope. As a result, any authenticated non-superuser holding the import permission could view every Import record on the instance (original filename, file_path, filesize, import_type and creation timestamp) and could invoke the selectFile($id) Livewire action with any auto-incrementing Import ID to load another user's record, exposing its stored preview data (header_row column headers and first_row, the first data row of the CSV). Because import CSVs commonly contain personal data, asset serial numbers and license keys, this discloses sensitive information; in Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS) deployments the disclosure also crosses company/tenant boundaries. Impact is limited to preview data rather than the full CSV file, and superusers were unaffected. Fixed in version 8.7.0, which scopes non-superuser reads to imports owned by the caller. |
| Snipe-IT versions up to and including 8.6.3 contain a race condition (TOCTOU) in the consumable checkout API endpoint (POST /api/v1/consumables/{consumable_id}/checkout). The requested quantity is validated against the number of remaining units before the database transaction begins, and the transaction then creates the checkout records without locking the consumable row or re-checking availability. An authenticated user with permission to check out consumables can submit concurrent checkout requests for the same consumable so that both requests pass the availability check and succeed, over-allocating stock and driving the remaining inventory negative (e.g., a consumable with 1 remaining unit ends at -1 after two concurrent 1-unit checkouts). The issue is fixed in 8.7.0, which re-fetches the parent row under lockForUpdate inside the transaction and re-validates availability. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to apply company scope filtering to the GET /hardware/requested endpoint when Full Multiple Company Support is enabled, allowing authenticated users with assets.view permission to read pending asset requests from all companies. Attackers can retrieve cross-tenant data including requested asset names, requester display names and profile links, locations, and expected check-in dates without parameter manipulation. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to HTML-escape the employee_num field in the acceptance PDF generator, allowing attackers with users.edit permission to inject img tags into TCPDF's writeHTML() function. Attackers can craft a malicious employee_num value containing an img tag with an arbitrary HTTP(S) URL to trigger server-side requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or external targets when a victim signs an asset acceptance. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in DepartmentPresenter::formattedNameLink() where department names are rendered unescaped in the fallback branch for users without departments.view permission. Users with departments.edit permission can inject malicious scripts into department names that execute in the browsers of all department members when they load their My Assets page. |
| Snipe-IT through version 8.6.3 fails to perform object-level authorization in the updateLicense, updateConsumable, updateAccessory, and updateModel endpoints and in the storeModel endpoint for Predefined Kits. The existing check authorizes only the parent Predefined Kit (update on PredefinedKit) and not the child object being attached. As a result, an authenticated user holding only the kits.edit permission can attach a License, Consumable, Accessory, or Asset Model that they are otherwise denied (HTTP 403) from reading directly to a Predefined Kit, and the kit relation index then discloses the attached object's name back to that low-privilege user. This is the update-path and storeModel counterpart to CVE-2026-55478, which fixed only the storeLicense, storeConsumable, and storeAccessory methods in 8.6.2. Note that updateModel was code-vulnerable in 8.6.3 but not reachable in practice because a route-name typo bound the route to a nonexistent controller method, causing HTTP 500 responses. The issue is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0. |
